The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
UK future
posture that can be perceived as leaving Iran in a stronger
position will not
be
welcomed.”
966.
On 6 April,
Mr Prentice attended the MCNS, which was told that in Basra
the
situation
was “stable with the ISF fully able to control the
situation”.478
The main
priority
now was
finding civilian employment for 25,000 unemployed. Acting Justice
Minister
Dr Safa
al-Safi had been appointed to co-ordinate the Iraqi Government’s
economic
efforts in
Basra.
967.
The main
concern on the horizon was the protest in Baghdad planned
by
Muqtada
al-Sadr for later in the week.
968.
Dr Rubaie
believed that agreement had been reached to confine the
demonstration
to Sadr
City and to ensure that it would have no “inappropriate
slogans/banners”. The
ISF would
work hard to protect the crowds from attack but also to control any
violence
from within
the crowds. In the event, Muqtada al-Sadr called off the
protest.479
969.
On 7 April, a
government official working closely with the military in Basra sent
a
“snapshot”
of the area to London. The official reported that the “Basra
landscape has, in
the space
of two weeks, changed dramatically.”480
Prime
Minister Maliki was reported to
have
“loudly blamed the British for treating with the JAM ‘criminals’
and, hence, handing
Basra over
to them”.
970.
The official
argued that the “unsatisfactory” performance of the ISF in the
initial
offensive
of the Charge of the Knights was a “vindication” of the objective
to negotiate
reduced
levels of violence:
“Within
four days the Al-Maliki offensive had brutally exposed the
inadequacies of
the ISF,
united the Sadrist militias that we strove for so long to divide,
and restored
JAM
military prowess and morale … to excellent health.”
971.
A meeting
attended only by UK staff had discussed the future of
the
accommodation
negotiated with JAM1. The official reported that they told the
meeting
it had
“been a child of its time”:
“It was not
dead (indeed JAM seemed keen to keep it alive and had sent
warm
greetings …
that morning) but its influence over British operational policy
should
be
proportional to its fundamental usefulness. [JAM1] was on the run
and the
ISF, backed
by MNF, were back at war with JAM. But – it was still both a
potential
weapon and
an insurance policy. Essentially we should exploit it but not
be
restricted by
it.”
478
eGram
13078/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 7 April 2008, ‘Iraq: Ministerial
Committee on National
Security,
06 April 2008’.
479
Email FCO
[junior official] to Prentice, 9 April 2008, ‘Call on NSA Rubaie, 8
April’.
480
Email
government official working closely with the military, 7 April
2008, ‘Basrah: A Snapshot’.
362