1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
•
requested
the Security Council to re-establish the Special
Commission,
including:
{{creating
a “new executive bureau to lead and direct all the activities
and
functions”
of the Commission: it should comprise “an equal number
of
members who
represent the nations that are Permanent Members of
the
Security
Council”, with the chairmanship of the bureau filled on a
rotation
basis.
“Iraq should participate as an observer in the bureau’s
work”;
{{restructuring
the Commission’s offices in New York, Bahrain and
Baghdad
on the same
basis; and
{{moving
the Commission’s main office from New York to either Geneva
or
Vienna “to
insulate it from the direct influence” of the US;
•
stated that
“The Security Council and all its members, particularly the
Permanent
Members,
should observe – legally, politically and in practice – the
resolutions
of the
Council which stipulate that the sovereignty of Iraq should be
respected”.
They should
also abide by the Charter of the UN and the 23 February
MOU;
•
stated that
the Security Council should “call to account” members who
violated
those
principles, including banning “flights over the northern and
southern parts
of Iraq by
certain Permanent Members of the Council”; and
•
stated
that, to express “its good intentions” and its desire that “its
decisions
should be
correctly interpreted and not tendentiously explained as
non-
compliance”,
Iraq would permit monitoring activities to continue provided that
the
individuals
responsible strictly respected provisions of the 23 February
MOU in
relation to
the sovereignty, security and dignity of Iraq.
547.
Providing the
context for its decision, Iraq stated that it had fulfilled all
the
obligations
imposed on it in the hope that this would lead to the lifting of
“unjust
sanctions”
but the US had:
“… resorted
to all ways and means to maintain the unjust sanctions … and
to
obstruct
and prevent any action by the Security Council that would recognize
what
Iraq has
achieved in fulfilling the requirements of the Security Council
…”
548.
Iraq stated
that the Special Commission was “foremost” among the
instruments
used by the
US, and that the US controlled its “leadership, activities and mode
of
operation”.
This had turned the Commission into a:
“…
disgraced instrument for implementing the criminal American policy
against
Iraq either
by finding pretexts and fabricating crises with a view to
maintaining the
sanctions
or by spying on Iraq and threatening its national security and
sovereignty.”
549.
Iraq also
stated that:
•
The
Commission continued “to fabricate false pretexts and to perpetuate
its work
indefinitely”.
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