The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
view that
these were the work of JAM Special Groups and that there were
limits on what
MND(SE)
could do to respond. He commented:
“Our
position is somewhat constrained by the desire to maintain the
accommodation
with
mainstream JAM and the number of troops at my disposal … I shall
redouble
my efforts,
but I hope that this may prove to be a momentary aberration
through
which we
will have to stick it out.”
814.
Mr Browne’s
Private Secretary commented in the margins of
Mr Browne’s
copy of the
report: “All this will push CJO towards conservatism in his force
level
815.
On 21
February, the Turkish authorities crossed the border into Northern
Iraq as
part of a
military operation to deal with a terrorist threat to
Turkey.395
The
incident raised
tension
between Turkey and Iraq and also placed a strain on the
relationship between
the Kurdish
Regional Government and the central Iraqi Government in
Baghdad.
816.
On 23
February, Mr Prentice discussed the security situation in
Basra with
Dr Rubaie,
who confirmed that an order replacing Gen Mohan had already been
signed
by Prime
Minister Maliki based on a report that a “non-interference pact”
had been
signed with
JAM.396
Mr Prentice
commented that the UK had some understanding of
the balance
that Gen Mohan and Gen Jalil had to strike in handling the militias
and
that
“It was probably wise not to seek a confrontation with JAM,
while the army and
police were
still building their strength.” Dr Rubaie observed that there was a
difference
between
calming the situation and fearing to confront it.
817.
The day before
the 26 February deadline for ratification of the three new laws
by
the
Presidency Council expired, Mr Prentice reported the intention
of Vice President
Mehdi to
veto the Provincial Powers Law on the grounds that central
government should
have no
role in dismissing Provincial Governors.397
Mr Prentice
wrote that if the veto was
exercised:
“… the Law
passes back to the CoR, which is in recess until c.18 March but
unlikely
to do much
until after the Kurdish New Year later in March. The CoR can
then
reconfirm
or amend the Law by a majority of its members. If rejected a second
time,
the CoR can
override the second veto by a 60 percent majority of its
members.”
818.
Senior
officials from the MOD, the FCO, DFID and the Cabinet Office
discussed
the draft
strategy paper once again on 26 February, and made amendments to
it; the
394
Manuscript
comment Ferguson to Browne on Minute White-Spunner to CJO, 21
February 2008,
‘GOC MND(SE)
Weekly Letter – 21 February 2008’.
395
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 25 February 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (289) 24
Feb 08’.
396
Email
Prentice to Betts, 24 February 2008, ‘Meeting with National
Security Adviser Rubaie,
23 February’.
397
eGram
7171/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 February 2008, ‘Iraq: VP Mehdi
About to Veto Provincial
Powers
Law’.
332