The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
570.
The principal
challenges would be:
“•
Law and
order and effective administration.
•
Ethnic/factional
conflict.
•
Humanitarian
welfare.
•
Regional
agendas and interference.
•
Remnant
forces.
•
Infrastructure
shortfalls.”
571.
The paper also
listed “key drivers” that would determine the extent and nature
of
post-conflict
engagement:
“•
Relationship
with new leadership.
•
Level of
consent.
•
Level of
international support/perceived legitimacy.
•
Speed of
collapse/defeat.
•
Extent of
damage to infrastructure.
•
Compliance/extent
of defeat of Iraqi security forces.
•
Requirement
to remove elements of security apparatus to allow good
governance.”
572.
Lists of
post-conflict military tasks, dropped from the 4 September version
of
the paper,
were reinstated with small amendments. Pre-invasion planning tasks
were
included
for the first time:
“Pre-conflict:
•
Establish
FCO/DFID/MOD framework plan. Confirm in-country
liaison
arrangements.
•
Explore US
intent and acceptable scale of consequence management
commitment.
•
Develop
agreed responsibilities for elements of consequence
management.
•
Account for
post-conflict needs in targeting process.
•
Identify
Coalition sp [support] to Phase IV and any potential
burden
sharing.
•
Identify
regional attitudes to conflict and any possible reactions
to
outcomes.”
573.
The Chiefs of
Staff agreed on 2 October that: “Phase IV considerations
needed
to be
clearly understood, given that the inevitable UK involvement might
result in an
210