The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
402.
Mr Dejammet
added that the “basic goal” was continuing the work of
the
Commission:
“Nothing
would be worse than to call into question the main strength of
resolution
687 (1991)
and United Nations relations with Iraq. The system of ongoing
verification
and
monitoring cannot be suspended; the security of the region is at
stake.”
403.
Mr Dejammet
said that unanimity of the Council in a crisis was a “very
important
condition”
for France. If Iraq heeded the message from the Council it would
“be possible
to discuss
their concerns regarding the working methods of the Special
Commission and
the manner
in which it discharges its responsibilities”. There could also be
discussions
to “explore
prospects for resolving the crisis and to take into account the
significant
progress …
on the substance, notably on the nuclear and ballistic areas”. The
Iraqi
population
had paid an “exorbitant price”, which could not “go on rising
indefinitely,
amidst
general indifference”.
404.
Ambassador
Richardson stated that the “unambiguous message to the
leaders
of Iraq”
was that the Security Council was “united in its determination that
Iraq must
comply with
the resolutions of the Council”; and that there would be
“consequences for
Iraq if it
fails to do so”. Mr Aziz had been in New York lobbying for
sanctions to be lifted,
but Iraq
did not “seem to understand that its objective can only be reached
through full
compliance”.
405.
Ambassador
Richardson added that Iraq had, for years, been “trying every
trick
to deceive”
UNSCOM. Its actions were “gross violations” of its obligations.
Iraq had:
“… failed
in other areas mandated by the Council and it has given no sign
that
it will
cease activities and policies intended to threaten its neighbours.
Indeed, it
gives every
indication that it intends to continue to develop a dangerous
arsenal
of weapons
of mass destruction. Which is what this is all about.”
406.
Ambassador
Richardson said that the US felt “compassion for the Iraqi people
and
empathy for
their plight”, and looked forward to sanctions being lifted, but
Iraq had first to
“comply
fully and unconditionally with … relevant …
resolutions”.
407.
Referring to a
statement by Mr Robin Cook (the Foreign Secretary),
Mr Stephen
Gomersall
(UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN in New York) stated
that
the UN had
responded “swiftly, strongly and unanimously” to “provocation”. If
Saddam
Hussein
returned to his senses and let UNSCOM resume its work, and then
complied
with all
relevant resolutions, the process for lifting sanctions could be
started. But if he
continued
to defy the will of the UN, “further measures” would be
taken.
408.
The Council
was facing “the most serious challenge” from Saddam
Hussein
since the
end of the Gulf Conflict. The successful completion of UNSCOM’s
work was
“essential
for maintaining regional and international peace and security”, and
its latest
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