9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
The CIG
judged that the insurgents in Anbar had proved resilient and that
support for
their
insurgency was undiminished:
“Large
areas of Anbar are outside effective MNF or Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF)
control. In
several towns and in rural areas insurgents are able to operate
freely.
Where the
MNF has an established presence, or patrols frequently, the
insurgents’
ability to
exert control is less.”
628.
The CIG
considered the ability of the Iraqi Government to assert its
authority in the
province
and judged that:
“Central
government’s influence in Anbar is weak. The provincial authorities
send
the right
signals about economic and security problems, but they have been
able
to deliver
little. Local administrative capacity is very limited and dogged by
tribal
rivalries.
Living conditions across the province remain poor.
“There is
little prospect of improvement in security. In a particularly
hostile
environment,
the Iraqi Security Forces will require MNF combat support
beyond
2007, or
risk ceding de
facto control of
further large areas to the insurgents.”
629.
The CIG
Assessment concluded:
“Prospects
for the Anbar tribal groups fighting AQ‑I will depend on their
gaining
broader
support among the Sunni population. We judge this will prove
difficult as
long as
rival tribal and insurgent groups compete for local power and
influence.
More broadly,
most Anbaris have no confidence in local political structures or
in
Maliki’s
Shia‑dominated government and its efforts at national
reconciliation.”
630.
An official
working closely with the military discussed proposals for Shia
outreach
briefly
with Lt Gen Lamb on 27 February and explained that the “main effort
was to
bring a
limited number of high quality interlocutors to the table”,
including JAM1.329
Lt Gen Lamb
was happy with what was proposed and content for the plan to
proceed
with
JAM1.
631.
According to a
JIC Assessment dated 31 October 2007, negotiations began
in
632.
SIS3 told the
Inquiry that the dialogue with JAM1 was borne of
opportunism.331
633.
Lieutenant
General Sir Graeme Lamb told the Inquiry that he was not
personally
involved in
the cease‑fire negotiations, but “became aware of a dialogue which
became
established
between the military, between [officials working closely with the
military]
329
Email
official working closely with the military, 27 February 2007,
‘[NAME OF OPERATION]/JAM
Outreach’.
330
JIC
Assessment, 31 October 2007, ‘Iraq: Risks to the Negotiations with
JAM in Basra’.
331
Private
hearing, 2010, page 60. Based on redacted material.
117