The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
and that
the FCO was considering whether there was scope to approach other
countries
to
contribute to UK military campaign costs (though the prospects were
not good).116
There was
precedent for approaching other governments to contribute to UK
military
costs.
Other governments pledged over £2bn to the UK to cover the costs
incurred on
Operation
GRANBY, the UK contribution to the international response to Iraq’s
invasion
of Kuwait
in 1990.117
The cost of
Op GRANBY was some £2.5bn.
178.
Treasury
officials advised Mr Boateng on 14 March that the MOD’s
estimate for
infrastructure
costs within the NACMO envelope included £10m for:
“CIMIC –
Civilian‑Military co‑operation. This spend is for force protection
with the
goal of
pacifying local, potentially aggressive populations … This is an
integral part
of military
operations and is still within agreed control totals – due to
over‑forecasting
179.
The MOD
subsequently referred to that allocation as being for
QIPs.119
180.
On 17 March,
Cabinet took collective responsibility for the conclusion
that:
“… the
diplomatic process was now at an end. Saddam Hussein would be given
an
ultimatum
to leave Iraq; and the House of Commons would be asked to endorse
the
use of
military action against Iraq to enforce compliance, if
necessary.”120
181.
Mr Brown
told the Inquiry how he had responded to advice from Treasury
officials
that he
should raise the issue of the cost of the military options being
considered by the
Government:
“I … made
it clear that the military option had to be one that was best for
the
military,
and that the Treasury would not in any way interfere and suggest
that there
were cost
grounds for choosing one option against another. That was not our
job.
The Treasury
was there to advise on how we could deal with the financial issues
that
arose from
the military decisions and the political decisions that were
made.
“So there
was no time from June [2002] when the Treasury said, ‘This is a
better
military
option because it is cheaper or less costly’. At every point, I
made it clear
that we
would support whatever option the military decided upon with the
Prime
116
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
117
Ministry of
Defence, Statement
of the Defence Estimates, 1991, Cm
1559‑I.
118
Minute
Treasury [junior officials] to Chief Secretary, 14 March 2003,
‘Iraq Funding’.
119
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’; Minute
Straw and Hoon to Blair,
19 March
2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution to Post‑Conflict
Iraq’.
120
Cabinet
Conclusions, 17 March 2003.
472