The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

393.  The British journalists covering the Camp David meeting focused on the

WMD dossier.

394.  The Sunday Express anticipated a “Dossier of Doom”.127

395.  An editorial in the News of the World claimed that the dossier would be “as

devastating as it is vital”.128 It would show that “evil Saddam has enough chemical and

biological stocks to attack the entire planet, and the missile technology to deliver them”,

and would confirm that he is on the brink of nuclear capability. The editorial concluded

“We believe Mr Blair CAN convince us a military attack on Iraq is right. We have faith in

our Prime Minister.”

396.  In their meeting Mr Blair told President Bush that he was in no doubt about

the need to deal with Saddam Hussein.

397.  Mr Blair argued that the strategy should be to seek two resolutions; one

making tough initial demands including intrusive inspections, with the option of a

second if and when Saddam Hussein did not comply.

398.  The UN would then need to accept the responsibility for enforcing its

decisions, or action would be taken without it.

399.  Mr Blair also set out the need to build a case to persuade the international

community of the threat posed by Iraq, including the potential for fusion of WMD

and terrorism.

400.  It was “critically important” that the US and UK made it clear that they

remained committed to the return of inspectors.

401.  Mr Blair cautioned President Bush about his assumption that the UK would

be ready to lead a strike into northern Iraq. But he told President Bush that the UK

would take a significant military role if it came to war with Iraq.

402.  Sir David Manning suggested that US and European opinion should be

reminded that, while the US and UK would prefer to take action through the UN,

they would find other means if that was not possible.

403.  Mr Campbell recorded that Mr Blair had discussed the content of a resolution on

the flight to Camp David; and that “after a long discussion”, Mr Blair had “[come] round”

to Sir David Manning’s view “that it was probably best to get a tough first mandate by

promising to go back to the UN, but make it clear that the UN had to face up to this”.129

127 Sunday Express, 8 September 2002, PM Sets Out Dossier of Doom.

128 News of the World, 8 September 2002, Blair Will Win The PR Battle.

129 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

162