1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
{{concealing
“the number and type of BW and CW warheads for
proscribed
missiles”;
{{concealing
“indigenous long-range missile production” and
retaining
“production
capabilities, specifically with respect to guidance systems
and
missile
engines”; and
{{concealing
“the very existence of its offensive biological
weapons
programme”
and retaining “all production capabilities”.
•
After an
incident at Abu Ghraib in June 1991, when IAEA inspectors
had
obtained
photographic evidence of retained nuclear weapons
production
components,
Iraq had decided “in late June 1991 to eliminate some of
these
retained
proscribed materials, on its own, and in secret and in such a way
that
precise
knowledge about what and how much had been destroyed would
not
be achievable”.
•
Iraq did
not admit its programme of unilateral destruction until March 1992,
when
UNSCOM had
“indicated it had evidence that Iraq retained weapons after
its
supervised
destruction”.
•
Iraq stated
that “The unilateral destruction was carried out entirely
unrecorded.
No written
and no visual records were kept, as it was not foreseen that
Iraq
needed to
prove the destruction to anybody.”
•
In 1992,
UNSCOM had not recognised that the programme “was a
determined
measure
taken to conceal evidence which would reveal retained
capabilities”.
•
It was only
after 1995 that UNSCOM had become aware of “concerted
deception
efforts and
was forced to re-examine the 1991-1992 period”.
•
Investigations,
including “extensive excavation efforts with Iraq”,
“extensive
interviews
with Iraqi participants in the destruction”, and analysis of
overhead
imagery,
had produced “mixed” results. There was “some evidence
supporting
Iraqi
declarations” but other data raised “serious concerns about the
true fate of
proscribed
weapons and items”.
•
Questions
arose about the reasons for Iraq’s actions including the
following:
{{Iraq
made an admission in August 1997 that missile launchers had
been
destroyed
in October not July 1991.
{{The
precise locations of warhead filling and destruction had been
revised
several
times.
{{Claimed
movements of concealed warheads had “been proven to be
false”.
{{Explanations
of concealment and movement of retained chemical
weapons
production
equipment had been “shown to be false”.
{{Iraq had
not declared the concealment of “production equipment
and
critical
components related to Iraq’s indigenous proscribed
missile
programmes”
in a private villa in Abu Ghraib, until March 1992, when it
had
been
retrieved and moved by the Special Republican Guard.
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