The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Although it recognised the significance of the impact of de‑Ba’athification on the public

sector in Iraq, the RAND report Occupying Iraq observed that the number of individuals

who left office in the first three months of Occupation (10,000) was still less than the

number of senior jobs normally vacated following a change of US Administration.69

General the Lord Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff from May 2003 to April 2006, told the

Inquiry that the removal of “a complete layer of administrative competence” was “not … a

particular help”.70

Mr Stephen Pattison, FCO Head of the UN Department until June 2003, told the Inquiry:

“… we should have realised that without those officials we were going to struggle

really hard to get this country going again and we should have reached out to those

officials in order to bring them back in by offering them assurances about their

pensions or their security or their jobs or whatever.”71

Ms Emma Sky, Governorate Co‑ordinator for Kirkuk province in 2003, told the Inquiry

that Major General Raymond Odierno (the US military commander responsible for the

province) had given an amnesty to teachers and doctors on his own authority as a way

of circumventing the Order.72

Mr Andy Bearpark, the CPA’s Director of Operations, told the Inquiry:

“… when I observed the effects of the [de‑Ba’athification] policy, I don’t believe that

some of the effects of the policy were quite as severe as some of the critics of the

policy point out, but that’s a belief or assertion on my part. I have no evidence to

support it.”73

In Mr Bearpark’s opinion, the issues that he encountered within the senior levels of the

Iraqi Civil Service had more to do with personal rivalry than real concerns about Ba’athist

control.

Mr Chaplin and Mr Asquith, who both served as British Ambassador to Iraq, told the

Inquiry that there was a sense of exclusion within the Sunni community as a result of

de‑Ba’athification, because they felt that it affected their community disproportionately.74

Mr Jonathan Powell told the Inquiry:

“… it was a mistake to go so far with de‑Ba’athification. It is a similar mistake the

Americans made after the Second World War with de‑Nazification and they had to

reverse it. Once it became clear to us, we argued with the administration to reverse

it, and they did reverse it, although with difficulty because the Shia politicians in the

government were very reluctant to allow it to be reversed, and at the time we were

being criticised for not doing enough de‑Ba’athification.”75

69 Dobbins J, Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional

Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009.

70 Public hearing, 1 February 2010, page 24.

71 Public hearing, 31 January 2011, pages 22‑24.

72 Private hearing, 14 January 2011, pages 27‑29.

73 Public hearing, 6 July 2010, pages 83‑84.

74 Public hearing, 1 December 2009, page 88; Public hearing, 4 December 2009, page 19.

75 Public hearing, 18 January 2010, page 128.

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