9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
Concerns
about a lack of balance led to a focus on constitutional
arrangements founded
on
proportional representation for Shia, Sunni, Kurdish and minority
groups, based on
the
assumption that those belonging to one confessional or ethnic group
could only be
represented
fairly by a member of the same group.
The
electoral system that developed led to the dominance in government
of Islamist
parties
such as Dawa and SCIRI from 2005, although UK would have preferred
a
moderate
secular leader. The UK sought to compensate for the political
dominance
of Shia
parties by encouraging active outreach to the Sunni
community.
The
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) agreed by the Governing
Council on 1 March
2004
intended that the National Assembly would have “fair
representation” for all Iraq’s
communities.
The UK thought of the TAL as a power-sharing arrangement, but it
could
not deliver
the change of mindset needed to embed genuine sharing of power,
notably
a majority
willing to listen to the representatives of minority
groups.
As
described in Section 11.1, the TAL prevented senior Ba’athists from
standing
for
election unless they had been successful in an appeal to the
de-Ba’athification
Commission,
and stipulated that “full” members must renounce the Ba’ath Party.
Both
measures
would mainly affect the Sunni community, and reflected anxiety
about a
Ba’athist
resurgence.
A key UK
objective for the new Iraqi Constitution which would replace the
TAL was
to protect
the provision that three provinces voting against it would
constitute a veto.
Originally
considered to be protecting Kurdish interests, after the January
2005 elections
this was
also seen an important safeguard for the Sunni community, which had
turned out
in very low
numbers to vote on membership of the Transitional National Assembly
(TNA)
that would
draft the Constitution.
In October
2005, the Constitution was approved. Like the TAL, it placed
restrictions on
Ba’athists,
and the party was banned from participation in “political pluralism
in Iraq”.
Although it
contained a range of rights and liberties guaranteeing equality
before the law
and the
right to liberty, the Constitution left some divisive issues
unresolved. In particular,
the text
did not make explicit how Iraq’s oil and gas reserves would be
managed by the
federal
government “with the producing governorates and regional
governments”; it left
the
question of Kirkuk for a referendum; and – despite containing clear
statements about
the right
to freedom of worship – stated in Article 1 that “No law may be
enacted that
contradicts
the established provisions of Islam”.
The
Constitution continued to reinforce the need for strict
confessional/ethic balance.
In relation
to the Council of Representatives, the federal legislature, it said
that “the
representation
of all components of the people shall be upheld in it”. Regarding
the Iraqi
Security
Forces, it said they would be “composed of the components of the
Iraqi people,
with due
consideration given to their balance and representation without
discrimination or
exclusion”.
In
recognition of limited Sunni involvement in its drafting, the
Constitution provided for
a committee
comprising members of the Council of Representatives “representing
the
principal
components of the Iraqi society” to recommend
amendments.
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