The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Iran
continues to be … associated with the SCIRI leadership, but is also
in touch
with other
Iraqi political groups and influential individuals.”
In early
July, Mr Sawers briefed Mr Rycroft that his main security
concern was the UK’s
ability to
patrol the border with Iran in Maysan Province:
“If we
remain stretched there, we could end up being seen as the soft
underbelly, and
therefore
at risk of even more attacks.”140
Since the
US had no diplomatic relations with Iran, Mr Sawers was sent
to Tehran at the
end of July
to deliver “strong messages … on [the] need to stop playing a
malign role in
internal
Iraqi security”.141
His
interlocutors denied that any such activity was taking place, but
were “keen to stress
that Iran
shared the same goals as the Coalition”.142
On 10
September, the JIC again considered Iranian activity and influence
in Iraq.143
It judged:
“Iran wants
to exercise significant influence over the post-Saddam government.
Much
Iranian
activity in Iraq is aimed at ensuring that Shia groups,
particularly its main ally,
the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) make progress in
the
political
process …
“Iran sees
itself as competing with the Coalition for influence in Iraq.
Tehran probably
draws a
distinction between stirring up trouble and authorising terrorist
attacks on
Coalition
targets …
“Recent
events, including the arrest in the UK of the former ambassador to
Argentina,
Hadi
Soleymanpur, have caused Iranian attitudes to harden. They could
provoke
violent
protests against the UK.”
The JIC
judged that the assassination on 29 August of SCIRI’s spiritual
leader,
Muhammed
Baqir al-Hakim, represented a “serious blow to Iranian aspirations”
in Iraq
although it
was difficult to assess the wider impact of his death on intra-Shia
relations
“which were
already tense”.
The JIC
observed:
“The loss
of a more moderate Shia leader poses the risk that a more radical
Shia
leader,
such as cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, will fill the vacuum.”
140
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 9 July 2003, ‘Iraq: John Sawers’
views’.
141
Telegram
267 Tehran to FCO London, 30 July 2003, ‘Iran/Iraq: Visit of John
Sawers: Security Issues’;
Dobbins J,
Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying
Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
RAND
Corporation, 2009.
142
Telegram
267 Tehran to FCO London, 30 July 2003, ‘Iran/Iraq: Visit of John
Sawers: Security Issues’.
143
JIC
Assessment, 10 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Iranian Activity and
Influence’.
252