8 | The
invasion
Lt Gen Fry
told the Inquiry that the UK “did not necessarily know at the time”
that Iraqi
forces were
weak; whether Iraq would use battlefield chemical weapons; and that
the
UK’s
operational planning was looking at the potential Iraqi response
“in as rigorous and
austere
military operational terms as possible”.258
Describing
his assessment that his division was ready for military operations
against the
assessed
capability of Iraqi forces and their likely courses of action, Lt
Gen Brims, GOC
1(UK) Div
between 2000 and 2003, and the UK Land Contingent Commander during
the
invasion,
told the Inquiry that the UK had “expected unconventional forces …
to show,
ACM
Burridge told the Inquiry that Saddam Hussein:
“… had
developed the view … that western militaries don’t do urban warfare
…
…
“What we
didn’t know was to what extent he would front-load those southern
cities,
Basra in
particular, and we subsequently recognised he put small elements of
the
Republican
Guard in amongst the Ba’ath militia the Al Quds and people such
as
that, to …
make them militarily more effective and … to put the frighteners on
the
51 Division
people who had effectively melted away, and they were coerced
into
getting
back into their equipment.” 260
413.
Within days
of the start of the campaign, the scale of the
unexpected
resistance
encountered in Southern Iraq, together with the effects of bad
weather
and the
slow down in the US advance on Baghdad, led to a media focus
on
perceived
difficulties with the Coalition campaign.
414.
The
evidence in this Section shows that, as a result, there was
considerable
concern
within the UK Government about the impact on public and
political
support for
the campaign in the UK, and concern about the Coalition’s ability
to
convince
the Iraqi population that it was determined and able to remove
Saddam
Hussein and
his regime.
415.
The UK
Government identified a need for better co-ordination
and
communication
of key strategic messages to different audiences in an
effort
to win the
“propaganda war”. Improvements to UK capabilities were
being
implemented
at the end of March.
416.
There was
also considerable debate, within and between the MOD and
No.10,
about
whether the military plan should be revised to secure control of
Basra
before
proceeding to Baghdad, including Mr Blair’s decision to raise
the idea with
President
Bush.
258
Public
hearing, 16 December 2009, pages 27-28.
259
Public
hearing, 8 December 2010, page 22.
260
Public
hearing, 8 December 2010, pages 38-39.
75