The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
is likely
to prove brittle and fold quickly”.254
The correct
military strategy was, therefore,
designed to
“make this ‘quickly’ very quick indeed”.
In its
Assessment of 19 February on what the Coalition might face in
Southern Iraq, the
JIC
judged:
“The Iraqi
forces currently guarding Southern Iraq are a relatively weak first
line of
conventional
defence. They face rapid defeat. There is little evidence so far
that the
Iraqis are
preparing for a hard-fought defence of Basra and other urban
areas.” 255
The MOD
advised Mr Blair on 24 February (see Section 6.2) that the US
plan was to
achieve
“overwhelming effect very early in the campaign” to dislocate the
regime by
decapitating
command and control and disrupting communications.256
As well as
the
practical
consequences of the deployment of ground forces and their move
“towards
Baghdad”,
the MOD stated that that should “remove any doubt in Iraqi minds
about the
Coalition’s
determination to remove the regime. It is therefore possible that
the regime
will
collapse … in the first few days. Nonetheless it is impossible to
predict … and US
planning
assumes up to 125 days of decisive ground operations.”
On 11
March, the DIS produced a Memorandum on the “post-Saddam” political
and
security
environment that Coalition Forces were likely to encounter in Basra
City.257
It stated
that the DIS had “no intelligence on regime planning to mount an
urban defence
of Basra
City” but “individual or localised resistance could
occur”.
The DIS
identified the forces which were likely to be at the disposal of
the regime as:
•
Directorate of
General Security (DGS) – the
“principal internal security force”.
“Typically”
such forces would be lightly armed and trained only in an internal
security
role. The
DIS assessed that once overall regime cohesion was lost, they would
offer
“little
resistance to Coalition Forces”.
•
Ba’ath Party
militia – which were
“expected to play a role in defence of the city.
They would
have small arms and limited training.” Based on reporting from
other
cities in
Iraq, the DIS judged that the threat to Coalition Forces was
“low”.
•
Saddam
Fedayeen – which might
be employed in an internal security role.
They had
“a well-deserved reputation for brutality and fierce loyalty to the
regime”.
They were
controlled by the Basra Governor and there might be “3–4,000”
within
the
Governorate. They would have access to small arms “but rarely use
armoured
vehicles”.
They were assessed to be “the most likely internal security force
to repress
the civil
populace and possibly oppose Coalition Forces within the
city”.
•
Mujahideen e
Khalq (MEK) – the numbers
in Basra and its environs were “unlikely
to exceed a
few hundred”. If there was a presence in Basra, the DIS judged that
it
would
fight, “if directly threatened by Coalition operations. But if they
are left alone the
intelligence
is contradictory as to whether they would fight with the Iraqi Army
…”
There was a
risk that Iran would send Badr Corps or Islamic Revolutionary
Guard
Corps teams
into the Basra area to take action against the MEK, “especially if
Tehran
considers
that the Coalition has not taken appropriate action against the
MEK”.
254
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: JIC Assessment and
Personal Observations’.
255
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What’s In
Store?’
256
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Political and Military
Questions’.
257
Paper DIS,
11 March 2003, ‘Basra: Post Saddam Governance’.
74