8 | The
invasion
In the
context of consideration of preparations for a campaign of
terrorism and sabotage
in the
region, the Assessment also stated that:
“… we know
that Iraqi Special Forces and other organisations, such as the
‘Saddam
Fedayeen’,
also possess the capability to conduct sabotage or terrorist
attacks.”
The JIC did
not consider the Fedayeen’s possible actions inside
Iraq.
In its
weekly intelligence summary of 16 October, the DIS advised that,
given the
limitations
in Iraq’s capabilities:
“… the
regime is leaning towards a war of attrition from within the
cities. Provincial
cities have
been garrisoned with food and troops … The regime’s aim is to
lure
Coalition
Forces into the cities and effectively fix them … Whilst Baghdad
remains
the vital
centre of gravity, Coalition Forces will look to bypass provincial
centres,
leaving …
Iraqi forces trapped …” 251
In its
Assessment of 6 December, the JIC anticipated that the Iraqi Army
could
establish
positions within urban areas, but “most R[egular] A[rmy] defences
are likely
to be
constructed further forward, nearer Iraq’s borders, or along key
roads and at
junctions”.252
Physical
barriers, “water barriers (created by flooding or by the
destruction
of
bridges), minefields, or possibly even CBW-contaminated areas”,
could be created “to
channel
Coalition Forces into urban areas or ‘kill zones’ where artillery,
or CBW, would
be used”.
The Iraqi “strategy would rely heavily on a static defence, largely
because
the Iraqi
military’s ability to conduct manoeuvre warfare is very limited,
even in the
R[epublican G[uard]”.
The JIC
stated:
•
“… provided
the security and military organisations central to the regime’s
survival …
remained
intact, Saddam would accept the sacrifice of virtually any forces
or territory
to the
coalition. Provincial cities would be defended, but ultimately we
judge that only
Baghdad
would be politically vital, as its capture would be a final symbol
of defeat of
the
regime.”
•
If the Special
Republican Guard and the Republican Guard remained loyal
and
effective,
they could “inflict serious casualties on Coalition Forces in urban
warfare”.
•
Morale and
loyalty was “weak”. If a rapid Coalition advance left Iraqi
positions behind
the front
lines, “many RA [Regular Army] units would probably surrender
rather
than fight”.”
The JIC
Assessment of 29 January 2003 stated:
“[M]orale
in much of regular army is low and … many soldiers are reluctant to
fight.
But as long
as Iraqi security officers remain with military units and able to
enforce
discipline,
fear of execution is likely to keep regular units at their
posts.” 253
In a minute
to Sir David Manning on 30 January (see Section 3.6),
Mr Scarlett wrote that
the JIC had
judged, “over many months”, that “once the invasion starts Saddam’s
regime
251
Paper DIS,
16 October 2002, ‘Saddam and the Dilemma of the Republican
Guard’.
252
JIC
Assessment, 6 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Options’.
253
JIC
Assessment, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: The Emerging View from
Baghdad’.
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