The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Significant
differences remained between UK and US positions on UN
involvement,
and between the UK and the UN.
•
International
partners were scarce and thought to be unlikely to
come
forward in
the absence of UN authorisation.
•
UK
officials recognised that occupying forces would not remain
welcome
for long
and threats to security could quickly escalate.
1472.
In the year
before the invasion, Mr Blair:
•
stated his
belief in the importance of post-conflict planning on
several
occasions,
including in Cabinet, in Parliament and with President
Bush;
•
requested
advice on aspects of post-conflict Iraq (including for
his
summer
reading pack in July 2002, for his meeting with
President
Bush on 31
January 2003, and twice in February 2003 after reading
the JIC
Assessment of southern Iraq and the Adelphi Paper Iraq at
the
Crossroads);
•
at the
meeting with Mr Hoon and the Chiefs of Staff on 15 January
2003,
asked the
MOD to consider the “big ‘what ifs’” in the specific context
of
the UK
military plan;
•
convened a
Ministerial meeting on post-conflict issues on 6 March
2003;
•
raised
concerns about the state of planning with President Bush;
and
•
succeeded
in the narrow goal of securing President Bush’s
agreement
that the UN
should be “heavily involved” in “the post-conflict
situation”,
a loose
formulation that appeared to bridge the gap between US and
UK
positions
on UN authorisation and the post-conflict role of the UN, but
did
not address
the substantive issues.
1473.
Mr Blair
did not:
•
establish
clear Ministerial oversight of post-conflict strategy, planning
and
preparation;
•
ensure that
Ministers took the decisions needed to prepare a
flexible,
realistic
and fully resourced plan integrating UK military and
civilian
contributions;
•
seek
adequate assurances that the UK was in a position to meet its
likely
obligations
in Iraq;
•
insist that
the UK’s strategic objectives for Iraq were tested
against
anything
other than the best case: a well-planned and executed
US-led
and
UN‑authorised post-conflict operation in a relatively benign
security
environment;
•
press
President Bush for definitive assurances about US
post-conflict
plans or
set out clearly to him the strategic risk in underestimating
the
post-conflict
challenge and failing adequately to prepare for the task;
or
568