6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
1466.
Mr Blair
told the Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 2003 that “the
‘Issue’
was
aftermath – the Coalition must prevent anarchy and internecine
fighting
1467.
In his
evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee on 21
January
2003,
Mr Blair emphasised the importance of the post-conflict
phase:
“You do not
engage in military conflict that may produce regime
change
unless you
are prepared to follow through and work in the aftermath of
that
regime
change to ensure the country is stable and the people are
properly
1468.
On 24
January 2003, Mr Blair told President Bush that the biggest
risk they
faced was
internecine fighting, and that delay would allow time for working
up
more
coherent post-conflict plans.662
1469.
Yet when
Mr Blair set out the UK’s vision for the future of Iraq in the
House
of Commons
on 18 March 2003, no assessment had been made of whether
that
vision was
achievable, no agreement had been reached with the US on a
workable
post-conflict
plan, UN authorisation had not yet been secured, and there had
been
no decision
on the UN’s role in post-conflict Iraq.
1470.
UK policy
rested on the assumption that:
•
the US
would provide effective leadership of the immediate
post-conflict
effort in
Iraq;
•
the
conditions would soon be in place for UK military
withdrawal;
•
after a
short period of US-led, UN-authorised military occupation,
the
UN would
administer and provide a framework for the reconstruction
of
post‑conflict
Iraq;
•
substantial
international support would follow UN authorisation;
and
•
reconstruction
and the political transition to Iraqi rule would proceed in
a
secure
environment.
1471.
Mr Blair
was already aware that those assumptions concealed
significant risks:
•
UK
officials assessed that ORHA, the US body that would
assume
responsibility
for the immediate post-invasion administration of Iraq,
was
not up to
the task.
660
Minute
MA/DCJO to
MA/CJO, 15 January 2003, ‘Briefing to Prime Minister’.
661
Liaison
Committee, Session 2002-2003, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the
Liaison Committee
Tuesday 21
January 2003, Q 117.
662
Letter
Manning to Rice, 24 January 2003, [untitled] attaching
‘Note’.
567