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6.5  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003
1466.  Mr Blair told the Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 2003 that “the ‘Issue’
was aftermath – the Coalition must prevent anarchy and internecine fighting
breaking out”.660
1467.  In his evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee on 21 January
2003, Mr Blair emphasised the importance of the post-conflict phase:
“You do not engage in military conflict that may produce regime change
unless you are prepared to follow through and work in the aftermath of that
regime change to ensure the country is stable and the people are properly
looked after.”661
1468.  On 24 January 2003, Mr Blair told President Bush that the biggest risk they
faced was internecine fighting, and that delay would allow time for working up
more coherent post-conflict plans.662
1469.  Yet when Mr Blair set out the UK’s vision for the future of Iraq in the House
of Commons on 18 March 2003, no assessment had been made of whether that
vision was achievable, no agreement had been reached with the US on a workable
post-conflict plan, UN authorisation had not yet been secured, and there had been
no decision on the UN’s role in post-conflict Iraq.
1470.  UK policy rested on the assumption that:
the US would provide effective leadership of the immediate post-conflict
effort in Iraq;
the conditions would soon be in place for UK military withdrawal;
after a short period of US-led, UN-authorised military occupation, the
UN would administer and provide a framework for the reconstruction of
post‑conflict Iraq;
substantial international support would follow UN authorisation; and
reconstruction and the political transition to Iraqi rule would proceed in a
secure environment.
1471.  Mr Blair was already aware that those assumptions concealed
significant risks:
UK officials assessed that ORHA, the US body that would assume
responsibility for the immediate post-invasion administration of Iraq, was
not up to the task.
660  Minute MA/DCJO to MA/CJO, 15 January 2003, ‘Briefing to Prime Minister’.
661  Liaison Committee, Session 2002-2003, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Liaison Committee
Tuesday 21 January 2003, Q 117.
662  Letter Manning to Rice, 24 January 2003, [untitled] attaching ‘Note’.
567
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