The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
and the
risk that a badly handled aftermath would make intervention a
“net
failure”
(in Mr Watkins’ letter to Sir David Manning of 19 November
2002653);
•
the
likelihood of internal conflict in Iraq (including from
Mr Powell on 26
September
2002, who warned of the need to stop “a terrible bloodletting
of
revenge
after Saddam goes. Traditional in Iraq after
conflict”654);
•
the
potential scale of the political, social, economic and security
challenge
(including
from Sir Christopher Meyer on 6 September 2002: “it
will
probably
make pacifying Afghanistan look like child’s play”655);
•
the need
for an analysis of whether the benefits of military
action
outweighed
the risk of a protracted and costly nation-building
exercise
(including
from Mr Straw on 8 July 2002: the US “must also
understand
that we are
serious about our conditions for UK involvement”656);
•
the absence
of credible US plans for the immediate post-conflict
period
and the
subsequent reconstruction of Iraq (including from the
British
Embassy
Washington after the Rock Drill on 21 and 22 February
2003:
“The
inter-agency rehearsal for Phase IV … exposes the enormous
scale
of the task
… Overall, planning is at a very rudimentary stage”657);
•
the need to
agree with the US the nature of the UK contribution to
those
plans
(including in the letter from Mr Hoon’s Private Office to Sir
David
Manning on
28 February 2003: it was “absolutely clear” that the
US
expected
the UK to take leadership of the South-East sector. The UK
was
“currently
at risk of taking on a very substantial commitment that we
will
have great
difficulty in sustaining beyond the immediate conclusion
of
•
the
importance (including in the ‘UK overall plan for Phase IV’, shown
to
Mr Blair
on 7 March 2003659)
of:
{{UN
authorisation for the military occupation of Iraq, without
which
there would
be no legal cover for certain post-conflict tasks; and
{{a UN
framework for the administration and reconstruction of
Iraq
during the
transition to Iraqi self-government.
653
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 19 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning
after UNSCR 1441’.
654
Manuscript
comment Powell to Manning on Letter McDonald to Manning, 26
September 2002,
‘Scenarios
for the future of Iraq after Saddam’.
655
Telegram
1140 Washington to FCO London, 6 September 2002, ‘PM’s visit to
Camp David: Iraq’.
656
Letter
Straw to Prime Minister, 8 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency
Planning’.
657
Telegram
235 Washington to FCO London, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After:
Rehearsal of Office of
Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance’.
658
Letter
Williams to Manning, 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning and
Preparation’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning Update – 28 February
2003’.
659
Paper Iraq
Planning Unit, 7 March 2003, ‘The UK overall plan for Phase
IV’.
566