6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
{{was not
subject to sanctions and had “begun to regularise its relations
with
international
financial and trading organisations, with a view to it not
being
economically
hamstrung by debt and reparations”.
•
To agree a
set of principles that would be useful from a planning
perspective
and guide
UK involvement in the short term. Those principles were that the
UK
would:
{{meet its
international legal obligations;
{{minimise
the suffering of the Iraqi people;
{{be
limited in what it could do to change Iraq until there was a new
UN
Security
Council mandate;
{{help
Iraqis to help themselves by using their own institutions to run
the
country;
{{stress
that its presence in Iraq was temporary, but the commitment
to
support the
people of Iraq was for the long term;
{{stress
that Iraq’s natural resources were for the people of
Iraq;
{{as far
as possible, ensure that short-term involvement did not
exceed
resources
currently committed and “keep options open for the
medium
term”;
{{expect
evidence of WMD to be verified by UN inspectors;
{{seek to
internationalise its presence in Iraq “as soon as possible”.
Ministers
were asked
whether they were content for officials to approach
potential
contributors.
791.
The IPU
checklists of objectives and guiding principles made no
reference
to operational
preparations for the UK’s post-conflict role in Iraq.
792.
MOD advice
to Mr Hoon was explicit about the inadequacy of
those
preparations:
•
UK
involvement in post-conflict administration would require a
significant
civilian
component: none had been identified.
•
Under
existing US plans, the UK would need substantial military
support
from other
nations: there were no formal arrangements to gather
such
support.
•
US planners
assumed a UK contribution to Phase IV that was
potentially
greater
than could be sustained: if Ministers wanted to set limits,
they
should do
so now.
•
There was a
need to consider the worst case: an enduring large
scale
military
commitment with commensurate civilian support.
453