6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
that, in
the absence of a consensus position on day-after, the CENTCOM plan
will
be
followed faute de
mieux.
“We believe
any unilateral US day-after plan would be seriously flawed. It
would
lack
international legitimacy, as the UN is unlikely to support it. We
expect the Iraqis’
euphoria at
being liberated from Saddam to turn quickly into resentment and
anger
at being
subject to a foreign army of occupation, a sentiment which is
likely to be
reflected
more widely in the Arab world. In a hostile domestic and
international
environment,
it will be more difficult to embed lasting political and economic
reforms
… All in
all, a recipe for a mess, with Coalition forces obliged to stay on
in Iraq
for years.
“The
arguments for following the UN route look compelling and … would be
very
much in US
interests …
“As soon as
practically possible, we envisage the Coalition military handing
over to
an interim,
civilian administration operating under UN auspices. With
international
legitimacy,
such an interim administration would be supported in the region
and
probably
tolerated in Iraq. Reforms conducted under its supervision would be
more
likely to
stick. And it would aim to oversee a sort of ‘Bonn
process’11
for Iraq,
under
which the
Iraqis themselves would create new political structures … Lasting
reform
in Iraq
will take a long time and the UN is more likely than Washington to
have the
patience
for the long haul.
“The
Americans, not unreasonably, refuse to put their forces under UN
control …
The answer
may be a Kosovo model, where parallel security and civilian
presences
co-exist,
both blessed by the UN, with the security forces responsible for
supporting
and
co-ordinating closely with the civil presence but not under UN
control.
“We are
unlikely to persuade all the agencies in Washington to see it our
way on
day-after
in one session of talks on 22 January. But our aim remains to get
an
agreed
Coalition approach. Without it the legal basis on which our own
forces would
act will
be, at best, unclear and possibly unsafe. We also need broad
agreement so
that we can
plan in detail how UK forces should conduct themselves in the
aftermath
of military
action. The Secretary of State [Mr Straw] will arrive in
Washington shortly
after our
talks conclude. We will … recommend how he might follow up in his
talks
with Colin
Powell [US Secretary of State]. Day after issues should probably be
on
the agenda
for the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Bush on 31
January.
11
A reference
to the process initiated at the international conference on the
future of Afghanistan convened
by the UN
in Bonn, Germany, in December 2001. At the Conference, Afghan
leaders reached agreement
on the
creation of an Afghan Interim Authority.
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