The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
As a whole,
the project failed to make a significant impact on US
planning:
“… the
project’s reports did not capture the attention of the State
Department’s senior
decision-makers
… Without a high-level patron, the … reports lacked the visibility
and
clout to
reach key decision-makers in time.”
UK
officials were aware of the project, but the Inquiry has seen very
little evidence of UK
engagement
with the working groups or analysis of the final
report.
The 1,500
page, 13 volume final report is publicly available in the US
National Security
Archives.132
It is a
compendium of papers prepared by the different working groups,
some
agreed by
consensus, others not.
The US
National Security Archive summary of the project highlights some
prescient
observations
in the final report, including warnings that:
•
the period
after regime change might provide an opportunity for criminals
“to
engage in
acts of killing, plunder looting, etc.”;
•
former
Ba’athists not re-integrated into society “may present a
destabilizing
element”,
especially if unable to find employment;
•
a decade of
sanctions had resulted in the spread of “endemic corruption
and
black
market activities into every sector of … economic life” that would
be
difficult
to reverse;
•
the
relationship between the new Iraqi state and religion was an
intractable issue
“which
ultimately only the people of Iraq can decide on”;
•
repair of
Iraq’s electricity grid would be a key determinant of Iraqis’
reaction to
the
presence of foreign forces.
The Economy
and Infrastructure Working Group
The final
report of the Economy and Infrastructure Working Group provides one
example
of the
range of material generated by the Future of Iraq
Project.133
Quoting
data from the US Department of Energy, the Working Group reported
that
85-90
percent of Iraq’s national power grid and 20 power stations had
been damaged
or
destroyed in 1991. The UN programme to restore electricity
generation in central
and
southern Iraq to pre-1991 levels required US$10bn, of which
$US4.7bn had been
allocated
from Oil-for-Food (OFF) funds since 1996. US$1.67bn of material had
reached
Iraq, but
only 60 percent had been put to use. In northern Iraq, problems
included:
•
damage to
transmission lines and substations in 1991;
•
the need to
replace major circuits constructed out of salvaged material after
the
region’s
disconnection from the Iraqi national grid in 1991;
132
The
National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 198, 1
September 2006, New
State
Department
Releases on the “Future of Iraq” Project.
133
US State
Department, The Future of Iraq Project, [undated], Economy and
Infrastructure (Public
Finance)
Working Group.
152