6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
675.
The
emergence after the conflict of the scale and nature of the
problems
encountered
illuminated the extent to which Ministers had been unaware
of
risks being
taken for which they would have been accountable. The
shortfalls
in
individual equipment, protection against chemical and biological
attack, and
ammunition
did not have an impact on the overall success of the
invasion.
676.
But they
did have an impact on individuals.
677.
In the case
of Sgt Steven Roberts, it was judged that his death could
have
been
prevented if he had still had his body armour.
678.
As the
evidence in this Section shows, reports about equipment
shortfalls
from the
media and from members of the Armed Forces also had a
negative
impact on
the perceptions of the morale of troops on the ground and on how
the
campaign
was seen by the public and Parliament.
679.
In
addition, analysis of the events in 2003 shows that, until May,
neither
PJHQ nor
MOD had a proper understanding of the problems with equipment
that
units were
experiencing on the ground.
680.
Lord Bach
was right to have suggested on 11 February 2003 that a
direct
and robust
system accurately to report on readiness and equipment issues
from
theatre to
Ministers was needed.
681.
During
military operations, reporting to the MOD will always be
constrained
by the
limitations of military operations and the pressures on those
involved, and
military
commanders need the freedom to take operational
decisions.
682.
In any
future operations, however, the MOD should ensure that it has
robust
systems in
place to accurately report the situation on the ground without
usurping
the
responsibilities of the chain of command.
109