The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
663.
The force
deployed in 2003 was larger than the UK contribution in the
Gulf
Conflict in
1991 and the time to prepare was significantly shorter than the six
to
nine months
assumed in the DPAs.
664.
Lt Gen
Reith acknowledged in May 2003 that the military commitment
was,
“as often
happens, at a scale beyond that envisaged in the DPAs and thus
not
fully
resourced”.
665.
When
decisions were made in mid-January, the inherent risks for
equipping
the force
to be deployed and its readiness were neither properly identified
nor
considered.
666.
The
military advice in late January 2003 that there were “no
showstoppers”
disguised
the fact that risks had been accepted which had not been fully
exposed
to
Ministers.
667.
Adm Boyce
had assured Mr Blair on 13 March 2003 that the Armed
Forces
faced “no
serious equipment problems”.
668.
The context
suggests he was referring to the invasion phase. As Section
8
shows, the
US and UK did not expect Iraqi forces to be able effectively to
resist
Coalition
Forces.
669.
There may
be circumstances in the future when a Government will feel
it
necessary
to take decisions to commit the Armed Forces to military
operations
which
exceed the planning assumptions on which they have been equipped
and
prepared.
But they should not do so without an explicit acceptance of the
risks
being
taken.
670.
In
addition, a number of lessons from previous conflicts and exercises
had
not been
addressed before the deployment to Iraq.
671.
In
particular, poor asset tracking systems meant that an already
over-
burdened
system was put under even greater pressure, and equipment that
had
been
deployed to the forces in Kuwait did not reach the front line
before military
operations
began.
672.
ACM Stirrup
accurately summarised the position when he told the
Inquiry
that “the
issue was it was all being done so rapidly at the last minute no
one was
quite sure
who had what”.
673.
The MOD’s
asset tracking system was still in need of improvement when
the
UK left
Iraq in 2009.
674.
The MOD had
given assurances before the 2003 invasion that the
necessary
lessons had
been learned since 1991. This proved not to be the case. In any
future
eventuality,
the MOD has a responsibility to ensure that past mistakes are
not
repeated,
and that its systems for asset tracking are robust.
108