6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
653.
However,
the most senior military officers and officials understood
the
political
and diplomatic reasons for that decision and Ministers were not
advised
that the
restrictions would have a direct adverse impact on
capabilities.
654.
The
problems encountered by the forces deployed to Iraq in early 2003
do
not appear
to have been directly attributable to the absence of discussions
with
industry
before 15 October.
655.
The
evidence suggests that most of the difficulties arose from the
decisions
to deploy a
force more quickly than the Defence Planning Assumptions
(DPAs)
envisaged.
656.
The 1998
Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and Defence Strategic Plan had
set
clear
guidelines about the military resources required for potential
operations of
different
scale and duration. The DPAs also set out the time likely to be
necessary
to
adequately prepare UK forces for operations, including the time
needed to
procure and
deploy equipment and train personnel on its use.
657.
The DPAs
determined the equipment procured for the Armed Forces
and
that the
stocks held should be sufficient only to meet the readiness
requirements
specified
in the DPAs.
658.
The 1998
SDR had also concluded that the UK needed a better
expeditionary
capability
to reflect the nature of future threats and the environments, such
as the
Gulf, in
which the UK should plan to operate.
659.
By 2002,
when military planning for potential operations in Iraq
commenced,
that
capability had not been fully achieved.
660.
The policy
underpinning the DPAs of relying on sufficient preparation
time
to procure
UORs and additional stocks to meet identified shortfalls before a
large
scale
deployment was explicitly acknowledged by the MOD in spring
2002.
661.
In the
second half of 2002, however, the MOD was already supporting
two
simultaneous
medium scale operations, in the Balkans and Operation
FRESCO,
and a
number of small scale operations, including in Afghanistan. The
Armed
Forces were
thus already stretched to the maximum level envisaged
under
the DPAs,
beyond which time would be needed to acquire additional
stocks
and equipment.
662.
The
decisions between mid-December 2002 and mid-January 2003,
to
increase
the force deployed for ground operations to three combat
brigades
and the
decisions to commit 16 Air Assault Brigade and 7 Armoured Brigade
to
military
operations in southern Iraq in late March, had a significant impact
on the
scale of
some UORs and compressed the time available for the provision
and
delivery of
equipment to front line units.
107