The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
an
attractive option in the face of imminent Coalition military
action”. There
was
“unlikely” to be any advance warning of an attack on the Kurds. The
JIC
judged that
“a pre-emptive limited artillery strike on Kuwait using CBW
could
be launched
in as little as two hours”. Preparations for an attack on Israel
were
“likely to
be, more extensive and to stretch Iraqi capabilities to the
limit”.
•
There were
indications of “plans to sabotage oil fields to prevent them
falling
into Coalition
hands”.
•
There were
“continuing Iraqi military defensive preparations,
including
deployments
and reinforcements of military units in the South, West and
along
the border
of the Kurdish autonomous zone” which appeared to be
“directed
against the
threat of both an internal uprising and external attack”. That
included
“possibly
1,000 troops on the al-Faw peninsula, apparently in response to
the
Coalition
build-up in Kuwait”.
•
Iraq’s
options for redeployment in the South were “limited”: “Any
significant
redeployment
in the South would risk triggering a Coalition attack by
breaching
the
Southern No-Drive Zone.” The regime did not “trust the Republican
Guard
enough to
deploy them in Baghdad, except possibly as a last resort,
leaving
them
exposed beyond the capital’s boundaries”.
•
The regime
was “maintaining ‘business as usual’: anybody thinking of
deserting
will face
serious consequences […] we may not see clear signs of dissent
or
defection
until the regime is about to fall”.
•
The JIC
judged that “most Iraqis will welcome the departure of Saddam. A
few
reports
suggest that some Iraqis may fight to defend their homeland from
what
they see as
external aggression […] Overall we judge that while Iraqis may
not
welcome
military forces, they will at least acquiesce in Coalition military
action
to topple
the regime, as long as civilian casualties are limited … [M]orale
in
much of
regular army is low and … many soldiers are reluctant to fight.
But
as long as
Iraqi security officers remain with military units and able to
enforce
discipline,
fear of execution is likely to keep regular units at their
posts.”
•
Saddam
Hussein was “already placing military targets in residential areas
to
score a
propaganda victory in the event of a Coalition air
campaign”.
•
“In the
face of an attack, or even before hostilities if he judged that an
attack was
imminent”
Saddam Hussein might take a number of actions, including
seeking
to “inflict
high enough casualties on any Coalition ground forces, perhaps
in
Kuwait,
including through use of CBW, to halt a Coalition attack and to
swing
public
opinion in the West against hostilities”.
•
“Once
hostilities were under way”, Saddam might also “seek to cause
an
international
outcry over the level of Iraqi or Coalition casualties”; and
“pursue
a scorched
earth policy, including the destruction of oil wells and poisoning
the
water
supply”.
432