The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
option may
in part have been driven by tactical considerations, and the
need
to maintain
the maximum pressure on the US to pursue agreement for
the
deployment
of UK ground forces with Turkey.
1428.
Mr Blair
had asked on 6 December 2002 for advice on the options for
UK
land forces
if Turkey refused transit.
1429.
Adm Boyce
did not instruct Lt Gen Reith to develop options for the
South
until 18
December 2002.
1430.
Mr Hoon
was advised that the decision on a switch to the South could
be
taken after
his visit to Ankara in January 2003.
1431.
From late
July until late December 2002, Adm Boyce advised Ministers
that
the UK was
not in a position to generate the forces necessary to conduct
combat
operations
at divisional level without US support.
1432.
Until the
middle of December 2002, Ministerial decisions and
military
planning
and preparations were based on advice that the deployment of a
single
combat
brigade, with four battalions, in a northern option and the
possible
deployment
of a Royal Marine Commando Group to southern Iraq, were
the
maximum
which could be deployed given the requirements of Op FRESCO
and
the
timescale for military operations envisaged by the US.
1433.
When the US
asked the UK to deploy to the South, there was little time
to:
•
prepare and
consider a detailed analysis of the options before
decisions
were taken;
and
•
plan for
and implement the deployment for operations which at that
stage
it was
anticipated might start by early March.
1434.
The
implications of the switch to the South in mid‑January and the
increase
of the
combat force to three brigades for equipping the forces deployed
are
addressed
in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.
384