6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
with
“knock‑on effects”, which the UK would need to work hard to
minimise.
A decision
to rule out Package 3 would need to be taken “very
soon”.
Adm Boyce recommended
that, “unless a definite decision is taken to say
‘no’ now to
Package 3, we must commit appropriate effort to
[Exercise]
Internal Look”.
•
Burden‑sharing.
Package 2 could “justifiably” be presented as a
“substantial
contribution”
but Package 3 would be “significantly more substantial” and “a
vivid
sign of a
willingness to share the risks”. The shortcomings in the US
tactical
plan for
the northern option “could be resolved if we were fully able to
engage
in planning
and to flex resources to make it work”.
•
Impact on
readiness and capability for other tasks. Either package
would
impinge on
the UK’s ability to respond to contingency operations, but
Iraq
was “the
central issue” and there might be “a trade‑off between
committing
to a
military campaign and committing to an enduring follow‑up
operation”.
A six‑month
war‑fighting operation was “consistent with the
Defence
Planning Assumptions”.
•
Aftermath
management and the long term. US thinking on the “Day
After”
was
“under‑developed at present”, but there was “likely to be a need
for a
substantial,
potentially long‑enduring commitment of forces. Assuming
that
military
action had taken place under a UN umbrella, it is likely that the
US
would look
to Allies and the UK to play a major role in this, perhaps
including
providing a
framework capability through the ARRC. We clearly have an
interest
in
minimising the risk of a long lasting commitment … in a part of the
world that
will not be
retention‑positive for our personnel: in terms of Defence
Planning
Assumptions,
a … medium scale PSO [peace support operation] in Iraq
would
only be
manageable if our commitments elsewhere … were capped at
small
scale. The
more substantial our contribution to military action in the first
place,
the more
plausibly we will be able to argue that we have done our
bit.”
•
Turkey.
Turkey’s attitude to UK forces might “remain uncertain for some
time”.
It was
“possible that some or all of Package 3 might be able to play a
role in the
South
(although space constraints might [have an] impact on
timing)”.
•
Wider
context. In the context of securing influence, the MOD had “been
taking
soundings
over what gives us influence over US campaign planning”. It
was
“clear that
sharing risk – political and military” was “crucial to having a
voice in
how a
military operation” was planned, and it also provided “a locus to
influence
the wider
overall campaign”. There was “thus a longer‑term and
strategic
dimension
to the issue of Package 3: not joining will reduce the influence
we
have over
planning”, including a change in the US “perceptions of the UK
as
a partner
longer‑term fostering a tendency to see us as a specialist in
Peace
Support
Operations rather than a war‑fighting ally, with potential
knock‑on
effects on
other areas of close bilateral cooperation (intelligence,
nuclear,
missile
defence, equipment and network‑centric capability, etc)”.
Contributing
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