6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
•
A judgement
that:
{{The
possibilities for a replacement regime were “very difficult to
assess”
and the UK
“must be clear on what we do not want”.
{{It would
be “difficult to apply force with sufficient precision to ensure
a
pre‑determined
outcome”.
•
Removing
the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD was “essential”. That would
mean
changing
the “regime to one that renounces WMD”, or completely
destroying
Iraq’s
capability and “remove [the] will to regenerate the capability,
which implies
regime
change”. That would need “much better granularity of
intelligence”.
•
Managing
the regional dimension would require the “footprint and duration”
of
the
military operation to be minimised, “commensurate with assets to
manage
unintended
consequences”.
•
Identifying
three phases leading to regime change:
{{Phase
1: While Saddam
Hussein was unsure of the Coalition’s intentions,
he would
avoid providing a “casus belli”. He was “unlikely to take
any
significant
military action” but it was “possible” that he would take
other
actions,
including accelerating WMD development and weaponisation
and
admitting
inspectors then obstructing or expelling them.
{{Phase
2: If Saddam
Hussein was convinced the Coalition was determined
to
overthrow his regime, his response would be “unpredictable,
ranging
from
benign/conciliatory … to military aggression”, including
pre‑emptive
attacks and
the possible use of WMD, and mining “SPODs [Sea
Points of
Disembarkation] or approaches”. That phase would
provide
Saddam Hussein’s
“best chance … to fracture the will of the Coalition”
and “speed
and agility” would be “needed once the decision to act
has
been
taken”.
{{Phase
3: In a
conflict phase, Saddam Hussein would go “into full
regime
(and
personal) survival mode, with no holds barred”. The most
difficult
action for
the Coalition to deal with would be if Saddam withdrew to
and
defended
urban areas. The Coalition plan would need to minimise
that
possibility
which supported the idea of a “surprise attack”. The
most
dangerous
response for the Coalition would be a WMD attack on
Israel.
•
Identifying
the key “strategic and military principles” which would affect
the
design of
the campaign:
{{an aim
that was “clear and both publicly explainable and
defensible”;
{{a choice
of options given Saddam’s unpredictability; and
{{surprise
and an aim to “maximise
strategic uncertainty in
Saddam’s
mind”.
•
Creating
political, military and regional conditions which would “keep
Saddam
off balance”
whilst preparatory activities were under way.
•
The need to
identify and prepare possible force packages.
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