4.4 | The
search for WMD
employed
and to keep its infrastructure and manufacturing base largely
intact …
This
positioned Iraq for a potential breakout capability.”
•
“ISG
uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long range
ballistic
missiles
with ranges from 400 to 1,000km and for a 1,000km-range
cruise
missile,
although none of these systems progressed to production
and
only one
purportedly passed the design stage. ISG assesses that
these
plans
demonstrate Saddam’s continuing desire – up to the beginning
of
Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) – for a long range delivery
capability.”
•
“Procurements
supporting delivery system programs expanded after the
1998
departure of the UN inspectors. Iraq also hired outside expertise
to
assist
development programs.”
•
“…
ISG
assesses that Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long
range
delivery
systems and the systems potentially were for WMD.”
Nuclear:
•
“Iraq
Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity
and
significance
of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear program but found that
Iraq’s
ability to
reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively
decayed
after that
date.”
•
“In
the wake of Desert Storm, Iraq took steps to conceal key elements
of
its program
and to preserve what it could of the professional
capabilities
of its
nuclear scientific community.”
•
“As
with other WMD areas, Saddam’s ambitions in the nuclear area
were
secondary
to his prime objective of ending UN sanctions.”
Chemical:
•
“Saddam
never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort
when
sanctions
were lifted and conditions were judged favourable …”
•
“While
a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have
been
discovered,
ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its
undeclared
chemical
weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no
credible indications that
Baghdad
resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter …”
•
“The
way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s
allowed
it to
conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program
…”
•
“Iraq’s
historical ability to implement simple solutions to
weaponization
challenges
allowed Iraq to retain the capability to weaponize CW
agent
when the
need arose …”
Biological:
•
“ISG
judges that Iraq’s actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrate
that
the state
intended to preserve its BW capability and return to a
steady,
methodical
progress toward a mature BW program when and if the
opportunity
arose.”
597