The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
munitions
(particularly artillery and battlefield rockets) and was prepared
to
use them”.
•
“Since the
conflict began, intelligence has provided further indications that
agent
production
was continuing in 2002 …”
•
“In initial
interviews senior detainees are maintaining that Iraq’s
chemical
weapons
programme ended in 1991 and that no weapons were
retained.”
Biological
weapons
•
“Very
little new intelligence relating to biological weapons alone has
been
received …
Detainees assessed to be involved continue so far to insist that
the
programme
stopped in 1991.”
•
“Confirmation
of the exact purpose” of the suspect trailers would require
further
work. The
trailers were “consistent with, although not optimally designed
for,
hydrogen
production”. Analytical results had “revealed organic chemicals
…
inconsistent
with the hydrogen process alone. Even if hydrogen production
is
confirmed,
technical analysis of the trailers has not undermined the
assessment
that they
are capable of being used, with only minor modifications, for
the
production
of micro-organisms.”
Nuclear
weapons
•
“Since the
start of the conflict limited information relating to a nuclear
weapons
programme
has been uncovered in Iraq. One recent report implies that
some
activity
which could be associated with a centrifuge programme was
undertaken
between
1999-2002 …”
•
Mr Mahdi
al-Ubaidi, the former head of the gas centrifuge programme,
had
“stated
that documentation was concealed from the IAEA” and
centrifuge
components
had been found buried at his residence. He “claimed that
the
nuclear
weapons programme was not reconstituted after 1991” but “there
was
an
intention to do so once UN sanctions were lifted”.
Ballistic
missiles
•
There had
been “no new information” about Al Hussein missiles.
•
Mr al-Huwaish,
former head of the Military Industrial Commission (MIC)
and
a senior
member of the National Monitoring Directorate, had claimed the
Al
Husseins
were “unilaterally destroyed in 1992”.
•
Post-conflict
interviews and some supporting documentation confirmed
previous
judgements
that Saddam Hussein “had ordered the development of missiles
with
ranges far
in excess of the permitted 150km range”. There were
“discrepancies”
about when
the programme had started and the planned range, but all
the
interviewees
appeared “to agree that the programme was still at the design
stage”.
496