The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
On
13 May, Mr Scarlett informed Mr Powell that a
“second possible mobile BW trailer”
had been
found in Northern Iraq on 9 May; and that imagery indicated “a
third suspicious
trailer in
the Mosul area”.99
Mr Scarlett
wrote:
“It is not
yet clear whether we will be able to prove that these trailers were
used
for BW
agent production … But our assessment is that the first trailer at
least (and
probably
the second) were capable of producing micro-organisms as part of
a
biological
process … It is not impossible that they are capable of producing a
crude
(liquid)
form of agent …”
“A great
deal of thought has been given to other possible applications for
these
trailers.
So far none has been identified …”
Mr Scarlett
added that “our experts” had ruled out the possibility that the
first trailer might
have been
part of a mobile pesticide unit.
Mr Scarlett
concluded:
“These are
significant finds. There is a serious chance (I should not put it
more
strongly)
that the trailers form part of the covert production facilities for
which we have
been
looking. Whatever their function … [they] should have been declared
under …
[resolution]
1441. At the right moment, and once we have reached the
firmest
judgement
possible … it will be necessary to explain their significance
…”
Mr Blair
commented:
“This is
good + we should keep a careful note of all we are finding. How are
the
Mr Scarlett
also provided a more detailed note produced by the DIS and a
minute
addressing
claims made on NBC
News, which could
not be substantiated and appeared to
be based on
the views of Dr David Kay. Dr Kay was described as “formerly
nuclear Chief
Weapons
Inspector for IAEA”.
On
15 May, an official in the FCO Non-Proliferation Department
(NPD) advised
Mr Tim
Dowse, Head of NPD, that Dr David Kelly, MOD Special Adviser
Counter-
proliferation
and Arms Control, had advised that UNMOVIC experts were leaning
towards
the view
that the mobile laboratory was not a bio-weapons
lab.101
The FCO
official was
concerned
about the implications of Dr Blix casting doubt on the UK’s
analysis.
SIS stated
on 16 May that the most important piece of evidence found so
far was “the
various BW
trailers, which we are now firmly of the view are part of the
transportable
production
system (TPS) for BW agent”.102
99
Minute
Scarlett to Powell, 13 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Second Possible Mobile
BW Trailer’ attaching Note DIS,
12 May
2003, ‘Iraq: Second Possible Mobile BW Trailer’ and Minute Cabinet
Office [junior official] to
Scarlett,
12 May 2003, ‘Second Mobile Trailer: The NBC News
Report’.
100
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Scarlett to Powell, 13 May 2003,
‘Iraq: Second Possible Mobile
BW
Trailer’.
101
Minute NPD
[junior official] to Dowse, 15 May 2003, ‘Iraq Survey Group:
MOD Task Force Meeting,
15 May’.
102
Letter PS/C
to McDonald, 16 May 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD’.
462