4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
and VX within
months, and in the case of VX may already have done
so”
(CIG Assessment,
15 March 2002).
•
“Although a
capability to produce some agents probably existed,
this
judgement
has not been substantiated.”
•
“The ISG
judged that by 2003 Iraq probably had a capability to produce
large
quantities
of mustard within three to six months. Saddam never
abandoned
his
intention to resume a CW effort.”
•
“… [T]he
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) may have maintained
covert
laboratories
… though this probably reflected requirements for
small-scale
operations
by intelligence services and special forces, particularly for
use
against
internal dissent.”
•
“The ISG
judged that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared CW
stockpile
in 1991,
although a small number of weapons either escaped destruction
or
suffered
only partial damage.”
“Iraq
currently has available, either from pre-Gulf war stocks, or more
recent
production,
a number of biological agents … Iraq could produce more of
these
biological
agents within days” (CIG
Assessment, 15 March 2002).
•
“The ISG
found no direct evidence of a BW programme after 1996.
It
concluded,
however, that Saddam probably intended to resume a BW
programme
if the opportunity arose.”
•
“The ISG
found that Iraq had dual-use facilities which could have
allowed
BW
production to resume, but not within the timeframe judged by the
JIC,
and found
no evidence that production had been activated.”
•
The
“judgements on Iraq’s ability to produce biological agent within
days
were based
on reporting of a TPS [transportable production system]
which
has been
subsequently withdrawn, and evidence (largely imagery) of
the
refurbishment
of a facility involved in BW research and production before
the
first Gulf
war. While acknowledging the possibility that a TPS capability
did
exist, the
ISG uncovered no evidence of such systems.”
•
“… the IIS
may have had a series of small laboratories conducting
small
scale BW
work … The ISG was not able to establish the full scope
and
nature of
the laboratory work.”
“Recent
intelligence indicates that production of chemical and
biological
weapons is
taking place” (JIC
Assessment, 9 September 2002).
•
“The ISG
found that, while there were no credible indications that
Baghdad
resumed
production of chemical munitions post-1991, Iraq did
conserve
intellectual
CW capability, and enhanced its chemical infrastructure
in
the mid‑1990s.”
403