The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Iraq’s
military had “planned for the use of CW, and … issued atropine
injectors
… to its
troops”.
Biological
weapons:
•
“Iraq has
biological weapons available, both from pre-Gulf War stocks and
more
recent
production”.
•
Iraq could
“produce at least” anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and
ricin.
•
the UK did
“not know how much agent” Iraq had, but it had “admitted
to
producing
19,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,500 litres of anthrax and 2,200
litres
of
aflatoxin” before the 1990-1991 Gulf War.
•
UNSCOM had
been unable to account for the growth media Iraq had
procured
which was
“enough for 25,000 litres of anthrax”.
•
Iraq had
“developed mobile agent production facilities, which makes it
extremely
difficult
for inspectors to find them”.
Without
distinguishing between chemical and biological capabilities, the
minute stated:
•
“UNSCOM
could not account for over 30,000 CBW munitions,
including
550 mustard
filled artillery shells.”
•
Iraq had
“admitted to producing CBW warheads for its Al Hussein
ballistic missiles”.
Ballistic
missiles:
•
Iraq had
“manufactured up to 100 short range ballistic missiles” and was
“aiming
to build
more using illegally purchased engines”.
•
Iraq had
“admitted … repeatedly testing a version of one of those
missiles”
beyond the
permitted range of 150km.
•
Intelligence
indicated Iraq’s aim was “to develop other missiles with
ranges
over 1000km”.
•
“Some of
the infrastructure built in Iraq since 1998, such as the engine
test
stand at
al-Rafah” was “far in excess” of what was “required for
existing
permitted programmes”.
•
Iraq had
“procured material suitable only for longer range
missiles”.
Iraq’s
“co-ordinated policy of concealment”:
“Intelligence
continues to show that such measures are being used.
{{Large
numbers of documents relating to Iraq’s nuclear programme of
some
years ago
were discovered at the home of a nuclear scientist …
clearly
demonstrating
an Iraqi policy of hiding documents and materials, just
as
we
predicted.
326