4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
885.
But the
dossier made clear that, as long as sanctions remained
effective,
Iraq could
not produce a nuclear weapon.
886.
These
conclusions draw on the evidence from the JIC Assessments at
the
time and
the Executive Summary of the dossier, which are set out in this
Section.
They do not
rely on hindsight.
887.
The JIC
itself should have made that position clear because its
ownership
of the
dossier, which was intended to inform a highly controversial policy
debate,
carried
with it the responsibility to ensure that the JIC’s integrity was
protected.
888.
The process
of seeking the JIC’s views, through Mr Scarlett, on the text
of
the
Foreword shows that No.10 expected the JIC to raise any concerns it
had.
889.
The
firmness of Mr Blair’s beliefs, despite the underlying
uncertainties, is
important
in considering how the judgements in the Foreword would have
been
interpreted
by Cabinet in its discussions on 23 September and by
Parliament.
890.
In his
statement to Parliament on 24 September and in his answers
to
subsequent
questions, Mr Blair presented Iraq’s past, current and
potential future
capabilities
as evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq’s
weapons
of mass
destruction; and that, at some point in the future, that threat
would
become a
reality.
891.
By the time
the dossier was published, President Bush had announced
that
the US was
seeking action on Iraq through the UN, and Iraq had agreed to
the
return of
inspectors.
892.
Rather than
the debate being framed in terms of the answers needed to
the
outstanding
questions identified by UNSCOM and the IAEA, including the
material
for which
UNSCOM had been unable to account, the dossier’s description
of
Iraq’s
capabilities and intent became part of the baseline against which
the UK
Government
measured Iraq’s future statements and actions and the success
of
weapons
inspections.
893.
As the next
Section of the Report demonstrates, the judgements
remained
in place
without challenge until the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Iraq’s
denials
of the
capabilities and intent attributed to it were not taken
seriously.
894.
As the
flaws in the construct and the intelligence were exposed after
the
conflict,
the dossier and subsequent statements to Parliament also became
the
baseline
against which the Government’s good faith and credibility were
judged.
895.
There will
continue to be demands for factual evidence to explain
the
background
to controversial policy decisions including, where
appropriate,
the explicit
and public use of assessed intelligence.
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