The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
878.
It is
unlikely that Parliament and the public would have
distinguished
between the
ownership and therefore the authority of the judgements in
the
Foreword
and those in the Executive Summary and the main body of the
dossier.
879.
In the
Foreword, Mr Blair stated that he believed the “assessed
intelligence”
had
“established beyond doubt” that Saddam Hussein had “continued to
produce
chemical
and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to
develop
nuclear
weapons, and that he had been able to extend the range of his
ballistic
missile
programme”. That raises two key questions.
•
Did Mr
Blair’s statements in whole or in part go further than the
assessed
intelligence?
•
Did that
matter?
880.
The Inquiry
is not questioning Mr Blair’s belief, which he
consistently
reiterated
in his evidence to the Inquiry, or his legitimate role in
advocating
Government
policy.
881.
But the
deliberate selection of a formulation which grounded the
statement
in what
Mr Blair believed, rather than in the judgements which the JIC
had actually
reached in
its assessment of the intelligence, indicates a distinction between
his
beliefs and
the JIC’s actual judgements.
882.
That is
supported by the position taken by the JIC and No.10 officials at
the
time, and
in the evidence offered to the Inquiry by some of those
involved.
883.
The
assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt that
Saddam
Hussein had
continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.
The
Executive
Summary of the dossier stated that the JIC judged that Iraq
had
“continued
to produce chemical and biological agents”. The main text of
the
dossier
said that there had been “recent” production. It also stated that
Iraq had
the means
to deliver chemical and biological weapons. It did not say that
Iraq had
continued
to produce weapons.
884.
Nor had the
assessed intelligence established beyond doubt that
efforts
to develop
nuclear weapons continued. The JIC stated in the Executive
Summary
of the
dossier that Iraq had:
•
made covert
attempts “to acquire technology and materials which
could
be used in
the production of nuclear weapons”;
•
“sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite
having
no active
nuclear programme that would require it”; and
•
“recalled
specialists to work on its nuclear programme”.
282