4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
Mr Blair’s
words, the US and UK had been “outed” as having taken a
decision
when no
such decision had been taken.
867.
Mr Blair’s
decision on 3 September to announce that the dossier would
be
published
was a response to that pressure.
868.
The dossier
was designed to “make the case” and secure Parliamentary
(and
public)
support for the Government’s position that action was urgently
required to
secure
Iraq’s disarmament.
869.
The UK
Government intended the information and judgements in the
Iraq
dossier to
be seen to be the product of the JIC in order to carry authority
with
Parliament
and the public.
870.
SIS was
commissioned by No.10 on 4 September to examine whether it
had
any
additional material which could be included.
871.
Mr Scarlett,
as Chairman of the JIC, was given the responsibility
for
producing
the dossier.
872.
The dossier
drew on the 9 September JIC Assessment, ‘Iraqi Use of
Chemical
and
Biological Weapons – Possible Scenarios’, which had been
commissioned to
address
scenarios for Iraq’s possible use of chemical and biological
weapons in
the event
of military action, previous JIC Assessments and the report issued
by
SIS on 11
September.
873.
The SIS
report should have been shown to the relevant experts in the
DIS
who could
have advised their senior managers and the Assessments
Staff.
874.
Expert
officials in DIS questioned the certainty with which some of
the
judgements
in the dossier were expressed. Some of their questions
were
discussed
during the preparation of the dossier. The text was agreed
by
Air Marshal
Joe French, Chief of Defence Intelligence, at the JIC
meeting
on 19 September.
875.
There is no
evidence that other members of the JIC were aware at the
time
of the
reservations recorded in the minute by Dr Jones of 19 September and
that
written by
the chemical weapons expert in his team the following
day.
876.
The JIC
accepted ownership of the dossier and agreed its content. There
is
no evidence
that intelligence was improperly included in the dossier or that
No.10
improperly
influenced the text.
877.
At issue
are the judgements made by the JIC and how they and
the
intelligence
were presented, including in Mr Blair’s Foreword and in his
statement
to
Parliament on 24 September 2002.
281