4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
The IISS
stated that Iraqi acquisition of fissile material was “not a high
probability”,
but “it has
to be seen as a real risk that could dramatically and quickly shift
the balance
of power”.
The IISS
regarded Iraq’s biological weapons programme as “the least
understood and
accounted
for by 1998”. Iraq could “plausibly” have retained substantial
quantities of
growth
media and BW agent. It was “not known for certain” whether Iraq had
resumed
production
of agent, but it seemed “a safe bet that it has, or will, in the
face of an
impending
attack”.
The IISS
judged that, from Baghdad’s perspective, biological weapons
presented “Iraq’s
closest
approximation to nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterrence or
terror”.
But, in
practice, “the magnitude of Iraq’s BW threat depends on its
delivery capability,
which
appears limited”.
The IISS
stated, however, that even if Iraq had not advanced the designs for
missile
warheads
since 1991, and depending on the agent used and a number of ambient
factors,
“casualties
in an unprotected population could run in the hundreds or even
thousands”.
If Iraqi
aircraft could survive opposing air forces and air defences,
delivery by airborne
spray
devices would be “even more deadly”.
The IISS
described Iraq’s chemical weapons arsenal as “better known and
less
threatening”.
It had “probably retained a few hundred tonnes of mustard and
enough
stable
precursors to produce a few hundred tonnes of sarin/cyclosarin and
perhaps a
similar
amount of VX”. It could have mobilised production facilities to
produce fresh CW
agent, but
its current capability probably comprised “hundreds of tonnes of
agent … and
perhaps a
few thousand munitions”. Before 1991 it had had “thousands of
tonnes of agent
and tens of
thousands of effective munitions”. Iraq had an ability to “deliver
chemical
warheads on
its rocket and artillery pieces, as well as aerial bombs”, but its
capability
effectively
to deliver chemical munitions with missiles or aircraft over longer
distances
was “questionable”.
Unless Iraq had advanced its pre-1991 designs, its ability
efficiently
to disseminate
chemical agent with missile warheads was “extremely
limited”.
The IISS
concluded that Iraq most likely had a small force of ballistic
missiles, “perhaps
a dozen
or so”, with a range of 650km and capable of delivering CBW
warheads.
Finally,
the IISS stated:
“As in the
past, the threat or use of force may compel Iraq to extend
greater
co-operation,
but signs of weakness and division in the Security Council are
likely
to invite
Iraqi backsliding …
“Either
course of action carries risks. Wait and the threat will grow.
Strike and the
threat may
be used …”
169