The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

would not use CBW during the initial air phase of any military campaign, but would use

CBW once a ground invasion of Iraq has begun. Faced with the likelihood of military

defeat and being removed from power, we judge that it is unlikely there would be a way

to deter Saddam from using CBW.”

The JIC judged that “several factors could influence the timing of a decision …

to authorise the use of CBW weapons”:

“• the availability of stocks of CW and BW agents;

• the survivability of … delivery means … Once a military campaign is under way

the pressure will increase to use certain assets before they are destroyed;

• the survivability of command and control mechanisms … Intelligence indicates

that Saddam’s son Qusay may already have been given authority to order the

use of CBW … Saddam may … specify in advance … the specific conditions in

which unit commanders should use these weapons e.g. once Coalition Forces

have crossed a particular geographical line;

• the reliability of the units … Late in any campaign commanders may not be

prepared to use CBW if they judge that Saddam is about to fall.”

The JIC also examined possible scenarios for the use of CBW weapons.

• Before a conflict – The JIC stated that the aim “would be to incapacitate

or kill Coalition troops in their concentration areas. Intelligence indicates that

… Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Israel and Kuwait” had been identified as targets.

“Turkey could also be at risk. Both chemical and biological weapons could be

used … But the use of CBW weapons carries serious risks and Saddam will

weigh up their military utility against the political costs. Use … would expose the

lies and deception … The early, widespread use of CBW or non-lethal agents

would affect Coalition military planning … On balance however we judge that the

political costs of using CBW weapons would outweigh the military advantages

and that Saddam would probably not use CBW … pre-emptively.”

• During the ground phase – “There is no intelligence on specific Iraqi plans

for how CBW would be used in a conflict. Large numbers of chemical munitions

would need to be used to make a battlefield impact. BW could also be used

although it is less effective as a tactical weapon … But the use of even small

quantities of chemical weapons would cause significant degradation in Coalition

progress and might contribute to redressing Coalition conventional superiority

… Iraq could make effective use of persistent chemical agents to shape the

battlefield … by denying space and territory to Coalition Forces. Booby-traps

and improvised explosive devices could be used … to inflict local losses in urban

areas. It is also possible that Saddam would seek to use chemical and biological

munitions against any internal uprising; intelligence indicates that he is prepared

to deliberately target the Shia population. One report indicates that he would be

more likely to use CBW against Western forces than on Arab countries.”

• Drawing Israel into the conflict – “… One intelligence report suggests that if

Saddam were to use CBW, his first target would be Israel. Another … suggests

that Iraq believes Israel will respond with nuclear weapons if attacked with CBW

or conventional warheads. It is not clear if Saddam is deterred by this threat or

judges it to be unlikely in the face of US pressure on Israel not to take such a

course of action.”

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