4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
•
“following a
decision to do so, Iraq could produce significant quantities
of
mustard
agent within weeks … [and] the nerve agents sarin and VX
within
months (and
in the case of VX … may have already done so)”.
•
Production of
VX and sarin would be “heavily dependent on hidden stocks
of
precursors,
the size of which are unknown”.
•
Iraq could
produce “more biological agents within days”.
•
“the
commencement of large-scale production of chemical and biological
agents
would
probably go undetected, and a decision to do so may already have
been
taken. The
location of production facilities is unknown.”
•
Even if stocks
of weapons were “limited”, that would “allow for focused
strikes
against key
military targets or for strategic purposes (such as a strike
against
Israel or
Kuwait)”.
•
Iraq “could
deliver CW and BW agents by a variety of means including free
fall
bombs,
airborne sprays, artillery shells, mortar bombs and battlefield
rockets”.
•
Iraq had told
UNSCOM that it had “filled 25 warheads with anthrax,
botulinum
toxin and
aflatoxin” for the Al Hussein missile and “developed 50
chemical
warheads”
for the missile.
•
Iraq retained
“up to 20 Al Hussein and a limited number of
launchers”.
•
“One
intelligence report suggests that Iraq has ‘lost’ the capability to
develop
warheads
capable of disseminating chemical and biological agent and that
it
would take
six months to overcome the ‘technical difficulties’”.
•
“an emergency
operational capability with conventional warheads” was
“probably
available”
for the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range ballistic
missiles.
•
“Iraq may have
other toxins, chemical and biological agents we do not
know about”.
•
“the
effectiveness of any CBW attack would depend on the method of
delivery,
concentration
of the target, dissemination efficiency, meteorological
conditions
and the
availability of suitable defensive counter measures”.
“Other
recent intelligence” indicated that:
“•
production of
chemical and biological weapons is taking place;
•
Saddam
attaches great importance to having CBW, is committed to
using
CBW if he
can and is aware of the implications of doing so. Saddam
wants
it to
dominate his neighbours and deter his enemies who he considers
are
unimpressed
by his weakened conventional military capability;
•
Iraq has
learned from the Gulf War the importance of mobile systems that
are
much harder
to hit than static sites. Consequently Iraq has developed for
the
military,
fermentation systems which are capable of being mounted on
road-
trailers or
rail cars. These could produce BW agent;
•
Iraq has
probably dispersed its special weapons, including its CBW
weapons.
Intelligence
also indicates that chemical and biological munitions could be
with
military
units and ready for firing within 20-45 minutes.”
Intentions
for use
“Intelligence
indicates that Saddam has already taken the decision that all
resources,
including
CBW, be used to defend the regime from attack. One report states
that Saddam
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