The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
hidden a
small number of long-range Al Hussein ballistic missiles;
and
•
retained
the knowledge, documentation and personnel which would
allow
it to
reconstitute its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic
missile
programmes.
541.
The JIC
also judged that, since the departure of the weapons inspectors,
Iraq:
•
was
actively pursuing programmes to extend the range of its
existing
short-range
ballistic missiles beyond the permitted range of
150km;
•
had begun
development of a ballistic missile with a range greater
than
1,000km;
•
was capable
of resuming undetected production of “significant
quantities”
of chemical
and biological agents, and in the case of VX might
have
already
done so; and
•
was
pursuing activities that could be linked to a nuclear
programme.
542.
Iraq’s
chemical, biological and ballistic missile programmes were seen as
a
threat to
international peace and security in the Middle East region, but
Iraq was
viewed as a
less serious proliferation threat than other key countries
of concern –
Iran, Libya
and North Korea – which had current nuclear programmes.
Iraq’s
nuclear
facilities had been dismantled by the weapons inspectors. The
JIC
judged that
Iraq would be unable to obtain a nuclear weapon while
sanctions
remained
effective.
543.
The JIC
continued to judge that co-operation between Iraq and Al Qaida
was
“unlikely”,
and that there was no “credible evidence of Iraqi transfers of
WMD-
related
technology and expertise to terrorist groups”.
544.
In
mid-February 2002, in preparation for Mr Blair’s planned
meeting with
President
Bush in early April 2002, No.10 commissioned the preparation of
a
paper to
inform the public about the dangers of nuclear proliferation and
WMD
more
generally in four key countries of concern, North Korea, Iran,
Libya and Iraq.
545.
When the
preparation of this document became public knowledge, it
was
perceived
to be intended to underpin a decision on military action against
Iraq.
The content
and timing became a sensitive issue.
546.
Reflecting
the UK position that action was needed to disarm Iraq,
Mr Blair
and
Mr Straw began, from late February 2002, publicly to argue
that Iraq was a
threat
which had to be dealt with; that Iraq needed to disarm or be
disarmed in
accordance
with the obligations imposed by the UN; and that it was important
to
agree to
the return of UN inspectors to Iraq.
547.
The focus
on Iraq was not the result of a step change in Iraq’s
capabilities
or intentions.
110