The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“New
intelligence” indicated “the main focus may be on the development
of a
SCUD
derivative, which we judge has an intended range of around
1,200km”.
“Work on an
engine for this system began in 1998, involving personnel who
had
been
reviewing the details of previous Al Hussein production since 1995,
although
by the end
of the year 2000 they were still experiencing technical
problems.
Additional
personnel were probably assigned to other parts of the
programme
during
2000. A large static test stand capable of testing liquid
propellant engines
bigger than
the SCUD engine has been under construction since
mid-2000,
probably in
support of this programme. Work on larger motor cases for
longer-
range solid
propellant systems has been noted over the last 2-3
years.”
•
“UN sanctions
and the work of the inspectors” had “caused
significant
problems
for Iraq’s missile industry in acquiring components and
production
technology,
in particular, for improving guidance and control systems
and
therefore
missile accuracy”.
•
Iraq was
“actively seeking to procure material for its missile programme”.
Imports
entered the
country “mainly via Syria and the UAE, with some also
coming
through
Jordan and Turkey”; “In the last six months, Iraq’s foreign
procurement
front
companies have become bolder in approaching Western firms,
[…].”
Chemical
warfare
•
The CIG
continued “to judge that Iraq has an offensive
chemical warfare (CW)
programme,
although there is very little intelligence relating to
it”.
•
From the
evidence available, the CIG believed that Iraq retained “some
production
equipment,
and some small stocks of … agent precursors, and may have
hidden
small
quantities of agents and weapons”.
•
“Anomalies in
Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM” suggested that
“stocks could be
much
larger”.
•
Intelligence
on production facilities was “scarce”; and “the reconstructed
former
precursor …
facility near Habbaniyah” was “insufficient to support large-scale
CW
agent
production. Other industrial chemical facilities could be used …
but we have
no
intelligence to suggest they are currently being used in that
role.”
•
Intelligence
had “indicated an Iraqi interest in transportable production
facilities for
chemical
weapons, but these could produce only small amounts of agent” and
the
CIG judged
it “more likely that the mobile units are for filling
munitions”.
•
Iraq could
produce “Significant
quantities of mustard within weeks,
using
hidden
stocks of precursors and with support from Iraq’s chemical
industry”, and
“Significant
quantities of nerve agents within months, mainly
sarin and VX”.
•
Production of
significant quantities of nerve agent would be “heavily dependent
on
hidden
stocks of precursors, the size of which are unknown”. “There had
been one
uncorroborated
report that Iraq had filled some artillery rocket munitions with VX
in
the period
1996-1998, and another that a team of chemists was formed in 1998
to
produce 5
tons of VX. The source had been told that this had been completed
by
the end of
1998.”
•
Iraq could
also produce “incapacitants”.
66