4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
Biological
warfare
Work on
a biological
warfare (BW) programme had
“continued throughout the period
of UNSCOM
inspections” and intelligence indicated “that this programme
continues. Key
figures
from the pre-Gulf War programme are reported to be involved.”
Research and
development
was “assessed to continue under cover of a number of legitimate
institutes
and
possibly in a number of covert facilities”.
The CIG
judged Iraq “could produce significant quantities of BW agents
within days of a
decision to
do so”.
There
was:
“… no
intelligence on any BW agent production facilities, but one source
indicates
that Iraq
may have developed mobile
production facilities. A liaison
source
reports that:
•
the
transportable production programme began in 1995;
•
6 road-based
facilities on trailers, and one rail based facility …
were
constructed
and by March 1999; three were operational;
•
the facilities
were capable of making five different
(unspecified/unknown)
biological
agents. Between November 1998 and March 1999 20-30 tons of
BW
agent was
produced.”
The CIG
commented:
“Though not
corroborated, we judge the reporting is technically credible.
Imagery
has yet to
provide firm collateral but has identified a number of sites that
could
be associated
with this programme. The mobile production facilities have
yet
to be identified.”
The CIG did
not “know which types of agent are produced by these facilities”
but
judged that
“Iraq currently has available either from pre Gulf War stocks or
more recent
production,
anthrax spores, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and possibly
plague”.
•
The “castor
oil extraction plant at the former Habbaniyah chemical weapons
site
may provide
the base for producing ricin”, although there was “no evidence
that
Iraq is
currently doing so”.
•
“Reporting
that Iraq has also conducted research on smallpox and other
toxins
cannot be
corroborated.”
•
The JIC judged
that Iraq was “self-sufficient in the production of biological
weapons”.
Delivery
means
•
Intelligence
indicated that Iraq had “command, control and logistical
arrangements
in place”
for the use of chemical weapons.
•
Iraq had a
“variety of delivery
means available for
both chemical and biological
weapons,
some of which” were “very basic”.
•
“Because of
the shortage of some platforms, such as aircraft and helicopters,
we
judge that
Iraq would not be able to conduct a sustained CBW campaign …
even
if Iraq
could produce enough CBW agents to do so. But a single major attack
or a
number of
small attacks would be feasible.”
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