4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
Biological
warfare programme
•
The JIC had
“good intelligence
of one facility that could be
used to support
BW
agent
production. Other
Intelligence which points to the possible research and
production of
BW agent is unconfirmed.”
•
Iraq retained
“equipment and
materials to produce BW” and it had
“a number
of delivery
options”; but there
was “currently little evidence of BW activity at
facilities
formerly associated with Iraq’s BW programme”.
•
The Assessment
pointed to additional intelligence on “Iraqi attempts
to recruit
new scientists
by people formerly associated with Iraq’s BW programme
to
work
on BW related
research, including genetic engineering”; “liaison
reports
of at
least six mobile
Iraqi BW production facilities for a
number of unidentified
agents”;
and “evidence of increased activity at a former BW
associated plant in
Amariyah”.
•
The JIC
continued to judge that “Iraq could
produce BW agent within weeks of
a decision
to do so”.
Iraq’s
nuclear programme
•
Iraq had
“recalled its nuclear scientists in 1998”. It had made
“efforts
…
since 1998
to procure items that could be used in a uranium
enrichment
programme
using centrifuges”.
Those
included: “aluminium
pipes [tubes]”
and “other dual
use items”.
Vulnerability
of Iraq’s WMD programme
In relation
to direct military action, the JIC judged that: “Although some WMD
facilities
could be
destroyed by direct military action, this would be unlikely to
have a significant
overall impact
on Iraq’s WMD programmes”. This was
because:
“•
we do not know
where all ballistic missile development is taking place.
There
would
be some impact
on Iraq’s permitted missile development programme,
but
military action would at best only delay
the development of prohibited
longer range
missiles;
•
although
targeting of Iraq’s remaining nuclear facility might
have some impact
on its
nuclear programme, it would be unlikely to
eliminate all nuclear activity,
some of
which may be taking place at other sites;
•
because much
of Iraq’s CBW activity can be conducted in legitimate civil
research
facilities,
Iraq’s CBW
programme
is likely to be unaffected by action against
known
suspect sites.”
The
Assessment stated that “targeting
of suspected chemical or biological facilities
would be
portrayed as attacks on the civil infrastructure and
would in any case
have
limited or no impact
on Iraq’s ability to produce and weaponise chemical or
biological
agent”.
The
Assessment concluded:
“…
our ability
to constrain Iraqi development of its WMD through
other
means is
limited. The
development of Iraq’s WMD has been helped in recent
years
by the absence
of UN inspectors, the increase in illegal border trade
and hard
currency available to Iraq. There have
been an increasing number of
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