4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
solid fuel
missile programme”. “Preliminary work” was “under way on the
150km
Ababil-100”.
Iraq “would continue with the development” of that missile and
“the
longer
range solid propellant project”.
•
“Series
production of Al Samoud could begin within months. A
longer range
version
might be developed over the same period.”
•
Iraq
“could assemble a
number of Al Hussein missiles for deployment
within weeks”.
•
“Without trade
sanctions and UN monitoring, Iraq could
produce a small
number of new
Al Hussein missiles within a year.”
Chemical
warfare programmes
•
“All known CW
production facilities and dedicated precursor plants
were
disassembled
or destroyed during the Gulf Conflict or subsequently
under
UNSCOM
supervision”; but “agents, munitions, warheads, precursor
chemicals
and
production equipment” could have been concealed from UN
inspectors.
•
Sanctions and
monitoring had slowed “reconstruction
of some of the facilities
formerly
associated with” Iraq’s CW
programme.
•
While there
was “no firm evidence of a chemical warfare programme”, Iraq
had
“continued
to acquire dual use
chemicals and conduct
research”. That “and
intelligence
of research
into weaponising aerial
bombs
suggests
that some
chemical
warfare activity continues”.
•
Iraq
“could produce
small but significant amounts of mustard agent within
weeks
of a decision
to do so. It could produce
nerve agent within months …
It
could
also
produce small numbers of CW munitions and missile
warheads.”
•
“Were trade
sanctions lifted, and in the absence of UNMOVIC, Iraq
could
re‑establish
a large scale production capability within a few
years.”
Biological
warfare programme
•
Iraq “claimed
to have … destroyed all … materials and weapons” related to
its
biological
warfare programme, but the JIC judged that it might “retain
hidden
production
equipment, stocks of agent and even biological
weapons”.
•
Sanctions had
“slowed but not prevented imports of dual use equipment that
could
be used in
a BW programme”.
•
Iraq still had
“sufficient
expertise, equipment and material to produce BW
without
procurement from abroad. It could use
legitimate civil or dedicated BW
facilities,
including mobile laboratories, for this
work.”
Nuclear
weapons programme
•
Iraq had
“retained the scientific cadre associated with nuclear weapons
work. Iraqi
entities,
some formerly associated with its nuclear programme, seek
dual
use
equipment that
could be used in association with a centrifuge
programme.
Unconfirmed
intelligence indicates Iraqi
interest in acquiring uranium and
continuing
nuclear weapons related research after the Gulf War.
None of
the
intelligence acquired since the war is ‘smoking gun’ evidence. But
it remains
suspicious
and seems indicative of attempts to retain a cadre of expertise,
which
will
decline over time without international access.”
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