The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• The JIC judged that “Iraq may already be producing biological agent and

could produce a small number of chemical weapons within weeks of a

decision to do so”; and, “were economic sanctions lifted”, Iraq could “build a large

scale production capability within a few years”.

• The same was “probably true for biological weapons”.

• There was “little evidence of nuclear weapons research”: but, “as in all areas of

WMD”, Iraq retained “expertise” and was “trying to buy dual-use materials”.

The JIC judged that Saddam Hussein would “seek to re-establish all his WMD and

missile programmes”:

“• effective UNMOVIC and IAEA monitoring would act as a deterrent and

constraint to his ambitions, in particular on the nuclear and longer range missile

programmes. But it would be less effective in monitoring Iraq’s development of

chemical and biological weapons, which could be more easily concealed;

• without economic sanctions but with effective UN monitoring, Iraq could

conduct research and development on longer range missiles. It could not,

however, put them into production. Its ability to rebuild a dedicated chemical

weapons or large scale biological weapons production capability would be

constrained. But Iraq could use its restored civil chemical industry and existing

biotechnology industry to produce chemical and biological agent. Effective UN

monitoring would act as a deterrent to Iraqi development of its nuclear ambitions;

• without either economic sanctions or an effective UN monitoring presence, Iraq

would significantly increase its procurement and accelerate its WMD and missile

programmes. Iraq could begin to produce a small number of new … Al Hussein

missiles within a year. We would be less likely to detect progress in other areas.

It would take Iraq at least five years to make a crude nuclear device and a further

two years to manufacture a nuclear warhead for missiles.”

The Assessment stated if economic sanctions were lifted, military sanctions would

remain in place for some time. If they were eventually lifted “both Saddam Hussein and

any likely successor” were “likely to give high priority” to restoring military capability,

“including WMD”.

How sanctions and UN monitoring had affected the development of Iraq’s WMD and

ballistic missile programmes, and how the progressive lifting of both would affect the

future of Iraq’s WMD capability against its neighbours, was examined in more detail in

an Annex to the Assessment. That included:

Ballistic missile capability

• The JIC judged that, following the Gulf War, Iraq had “probably concealed

components and a small number of … Al Hussein missiles”.

• Since 1991, Iraq had “expanded its liquid propellant expertise with the Al Samoud

missile”. Development of the missile had “accelerated over the past year as a

result of increased funding and Saddam Hussein’s personal interest” and “Iraq

had also been working on extending its range to at least 200km”. Iraq believed

that “with further imports, they could complete development work for this version

within 6 months”. Iraq was “also expanding a number of sites associated with its

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