The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Bush was
pretty vile about Fox, Chirac and Schröder [Mr Gerhard
Schröder, the
German
Chancellor] and to a lesser extent Lagos. He wanted to go for a
‘coalition
of the
willing’ meeting next week …
“TB said it
was time for the UN to show it could do its job.
“Bush said
that anything that weakened 1441 was not on. His plan now
was:
1. get
through Monday, 2. get through our vote; then 3. Coalition of the
willing.
“He and TB
then came up with the idea of doing the press conference before
rather
than after
the meeting in the Azores. I was opposed, felt it would fuel the
idea it was
all a
charade …
“His
[Bush’s] main line was that anything that takes us back from 1441
was not
enough.
This was the final stage of the diplomacy.
“TB said
the UN had to be seen to do its job.
“Bush felt
the TB lines re the divisions being between those prepared to use
force
and those
who were not would come best from TB not him … He said we have
to
come to a
conclusion at the UN. If we issue an ultimatum and the prospect of
force,
and France
says no, it becomes impossible.
“TB said he
still thought Chirac might say yes, but with a delay.
“Bush said
that if he went for yes with twenty-one days, he would reject it.
They are
the ones
being unreasonable, not us.
“TB said he
would definitely lose … RC [Robin Cook] …
“TB said he
was not sure where Kofi [Annan] was.
“Bush said
he had totally different problems to us re the UN … the pressure in
the
States was
to bury it. Then ‘I told Fox he has seriously messed up. He has
really let
635.
Mr Brenton
reported that President Bush was determined to remove
Saddam
Hussein and
to stick to the US timetable for action.
636.
The UK’s
“steadfastness” had been “invaluable” in bringing in
other
countries
in support of action. Helping Mr Blair to make the transition
from the
UN process
to military action was in the US’s own interests.
217
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
508