3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
“Bush said
when do you anticipate a vote? TB said we had pencilled in
next
Tuesday.
Bush: ‘Erm.’ Long pause. TB: ‘You want to go on Monday?’ Correct.
TB:
‘My
military have given me formal advice re the full moon.’ It’s not a
problem, said
Bush … TB
said he would have to check it out. There was a clear tension
between
Bush
wanting sooner and TB wanting later.
“Bush was
clear that the French position meant no UNSCR. But we were still
trying
to be
reasonable. He felt that on withdrawal of the resolution he would
give a speech
saying the
diplomatic phase is over, issue a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam, say
late
Friday,
which takes us to Sunday.
“TB went
over the politics here, how we were pulling out every stop. TB said
the
Tories
would see this as their chance to get rid of him, support us on a
war motion,
but not a
confidence motion.
“Bush said
they would make it clear to the Tories that if they moved to get
rid of TB
‘we will
get rid of them’…
“The French
had definitely allowed themselves to be presented as the
unreasonable
ones, which
was probably swinging opinion our way a bit, but it was still
very
difficult.
TB said it was important we still showed we were trying to be
reasonable.
But he said
if Bush could delay his broadcast till after our Commons vote, it
would
help.
Sunday, say you’ve tried, the French are being impossible, we are
working
the phones.
Monday, we take it to Parliament and say we must bring this to
a
conclusion.
Vote Tuesday. Forty-eight hours you go to their people and say
war.
The best
argument we had is that we don’t want our foreign policy decided
by
the French,
though TB was clear again that Rumsfeld’s comments had given
us
a problem.
“He
[Mr Blair] then started to press on the Middle East and said
if Bush would
commit to
publishing the Road Map, that would be a big breakthrough. We
needed
a fresh
UNSCR on the humanitarian situation post-conflict. Nobody doubts us
on
the tough
side of things, but it’s Middle East, humanitarian, democracy in
Iraq, that
people want
to hear about.
“TB spelled
out the symbolism in the Road Map. Bush didn’t quite get it but he
was
willing to
do it … But TB really pressed on him and he got it in the end. Bush
said
that we had
to watch out for the French, that they would be worried they had
got
themselves
into a ridiculous position.”109
334.
Sir David
Manning and Mr Campbell discussed the next steps and
news
management
with their counterparts in the White House.
109
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
457