3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
•
It had been
suggested during the negotiation that a requirement for a
second
resolution
“if military force was to take place” should be written into
resolution
1441. That
had been “dropped from the final draft”.
•
The UK
should “seek to lower, not raise the temperature of
relations” with
friendly
nations. It did not want to be, and would not be, involved
in
recriminations
between friendly members of UN.
•
If the
inspectors asked for more resources, that would be considered, but
the UK
could not
“be drawn into the argument from outside the inspectors’ ranks,
which
seeks to
imply that, in the absence of co-operation, more inspectors will
resolve
the matter.
They will not. Procrastination is not the solution to the
problem;
co‑operation
is.”
•
The
evidence in respect of Iraq’s possession of “chemical and
biological
weapons and
weapons programmes, and its readiness to develop a
nuclear
programme”
was “overwhelming”. Iraq had been “found guilty” in 1991 and
had
to “prove
its innocence”. The “absence of evidence in a huge country
where
there are
only 100 inspectors” did “not prove the absence of a
programme
… other
circumstantial evidence” had to be examined. Iraq had had a
highly
developed
nuclear programme in 1991.
•
No one was
“exaggerating the problem” and “no one had invented the fact
that
Iraq had
the programme [of weapons of mass destruction]”. Until Iraq
proved
otherwise,
the evidence suggested that Iraq continued to have “the
programme”.
•
There was
no evidence of links between Al Qaida and Iraq in respect of
the
attacks on
the US on 11 September 2001, although he “would not be
surprised
if such
evidence came forward”. There was “some evidence of links between
the
Al Qaida
organisation and Iraq, in terms of the Iraq regime allowing a
permissive
environment
for Al Qaida operatives”.
•
There had
been “very active co-operation between the intelligence
agencies
in the
United States and the United Kingdom, and the weapons
inspectors”.
•
He “shared
the anxieties” about military action which “should only ever be a
last
resort”,
but “on occasions” it was “essential to enforce law by force,
otherwise
the world
becomes extremely dangerous”.
•
It “would
have been better, in a way” to include the words “disarmament
by
force” in
the resolution, “but in diplomatic speak the choice was between
‘all
necessary
means’ and ‘serious consequences’. Everybody in the
diplomatic
community
knows that ‘serious consequences’ means the use of
force”.100
100
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 13
February 2003, column 1068.
243