The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
accelerate
his weapons programmes”. The report published in autumn 2002
(the
September
dossier) had “demonstrated determined efforts” to enhance
Iraq’s
nuclear,
biological and chemical capabilities. Dr Blix’s report to the
Security
Council in
January had “underlined these concerns”. Diplomacy,
intelligence
co-operation,
reinforced export controls, and interdiction and disruption
of
supplies
were options being used to “frustrate the ambitions” of other
regimes.
But “in
respect of Iraq”, those options had been “exhausted … over 12
long
years”. It
was the “deadly combination of capability and intent” which
made
Saddam
Hussein “uniquely dangerous”. Rogue regimes which showed
“total
disregard
for the rule of law, and share the terrorists’ hatred of our
values” were
the “most
likely source of materials and know-how”. Given Saddam
Hussein’s
“longstanding
support for terrorist causes”, the “terrifying possibility that
his
poisons and
diseases” would “find their way into the hands of Al Qaida
and
its sympathisers”
could not be ruled out.
•
Backing
diplomatic efforts with the credible threat of force did
not
undermine
international law. Law required
enforcement and Iraq’s failure
to comply
with “23 out of 27 separate obligations under Chapter VII of
the
UN Charter”
had “done great harm to the UN’s credibility”. Failure “to
back
our words
with deeds” would “follow one of the most catastrophic
precedents
in
history”: the failure of the League of Nations to face up to the
challenges of
the 1930s.
If the weapons inspectors confirmed “the behaviour which has
put
Iraq in
continuing material breach, then the case for a second resolution
will
be overwhelming”.
•
Disarmament
by force could be needed even if containment was
working.
The key was
Iraq’s immediate compliance with resolution 1441 and its
active
co-operation
to ensure its disarmament. The “proposals” for a No-Fly
Zone
covering
the whole of Iraq and for thousands of UN troops to assist and
protect
the
inspectors were “simply not feasible in the absence of complete
Iraqi
co-operation”
and “not necessary” if there was “co-operation”. If the
weapons
inspectors
were “unable to provide” a guarantee that Iraq was complying
with
its
obligations, Iraq would “have to face the ‘serious consequences’”
defined
in
resolution 1441; disarmament by force. The UK did not want war and
hoped
that
“Saddam Hussein would recognise the gravity of the situation and
embark
on the
pathway to peaceful disarmament”, but “the time had arrived to back
our
demands
with the credible threat of force”.
•
Military
action would not have a disproportionate effect on the Iraqi
people
or the wider
region. The UK had to
“strain every sinew, even at this late stage,
to avoid
war; to force Saddam to face the fact that he has to comply; to
offer,
as we have
already, an escape route to exile for him and his entourage”.
But
if military
action did “prove necessary”, “huge efforts” would “be made to
ensure
that the
suffering of the Iraqi people” was “as limited as is possible”. The
Iraqi
people
deserved “the chance to live fulfilling lives free from the
oppression
and terror
of Saddam”; and to “choose their own destiny and government,
and
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