The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
On 6 February,
Mr Blair said that the UK would consider military action
without a
further
resolution only if the inspectors reported that they could not do
their job and
a resolution
was vetoed unreasonably. The UK would not take military action
without
a majority
in the Security Council.
•
Mr Blair’s
proposals, on 19 February, for a side statement defining tough
tests for
Iraq’s
co-operation and a deadline of 14 March for a vote by the Security
Council,
were not
agreed by the US.
•
The initial
draft of a US, UK and Spanish resolution tabled on 24 February,
which
simply
invited the Security Council to decide that Iraq had failed to take
the final
opportunity
offered by resolution 1441, failed to attract support.
•
Throughout
February, the divisions in the Security Council
widened.
•
France,
Germany and Russia set out their common position on 10 and 24
February.
Their joint
memorandum of 24 February called for a programme of continued
and
reinforced
inspections with a clear timeline and a military build-up to exert
maximum
pressure on
Iraq to disarm.
•
The reports to
the Security Council by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)
reported
increasing indications of Iraqi co-operation. On 7 March,
Dr Mohamed
ElBaradei,
Director General of the IAEA, reported that there was no
indication
that Iraq
had resumed nuclear activities and that it should be able to
provide the
Security
Council with an assessment of Iraq’s activities in the near
future.
•
Dr Hans
Blix, Executive Chairman of United Nations Monitoring, Verification
and
Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC), reported to the Security Council on 7
March
that there
had been an acceleration of initiatives from Iraq and, while they
did
not
constitute immediate co-operation, they were welcome. UNMOVIC would
be
proposing a
work programme for the Security Council’s approval, based on
key
tasks for
Iraq to address. It would take months to verify sites and items,
analyse
documents,
interview relevant personnel and draw conclusions.
•
A revised
draft US, UK and Spanish resolution, tabled after the reports by
Dr Blix
and
Dr ElBaradei on 7 March and proposing a deadline of 17 March
for Iraq to
demonstrate
full co-operation, also failed to attract support.
•
China, France
and Russia all stated that they did not favour a resolution
authorising
the use of
force and that the Security Council should maintain its efforts to
find a
peaceful
solution.
•
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations
in
New York,
advised that a “side statement” with defined benchmarks for
Iraqi
co-operation
could be needed to secure support from Mexico and
Chile.
•
Mr Blair
told President Bush that he would need a majority of nine votes in
the
Security
Council for Parliamentary approval for UK military
action.
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